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Sharing the Load: Developing Better Strategies for Burden Sharing

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BACKGROUND

The United States now finds itself in a situation in which the range of threats it faces, above all from China, significantly outpaces its own power alone to deal with them. Fortunately, the United States has a vast web of alliances and partnerships to help it address these challenges. But, given the strategic deficits it faces, the United States needs its allies and partners to take a greater role in addressing these threats. Until recently, though, the contributions of most of these states to the security priorities the United States is concerned about, including some of the most important ones, have been relatively modest, if not in many cases negligible.

The Marathon Initiative’s previous DTRA study, “Realizing the Contact & Blunt Layers in Europe and Asia (2021),” offered an overarching framework for how to try to array its allies and partners’ efforts to optimally address shared security challenges. The governing logic of this approach is to work with the grain of allies and partners’ own interests rather than trying to “globalize” the U.S. ally and partner network. Predicated on the proposition that states are generally self-interested, it posited that an approach that works with allies’ own self-interests is more likely to generate greater and more relevant effort from them.

In this model, the United States would (with a few exceptions) focus on augmenting its allies and partners’ capabilities for self-defense or defense of nearby states. Thus, for instance, this model would focus Asian allies’ efforts on defense against China (and North Korea, in the case of the Republic of Korea), European efforts on defense of NATO Europe from Russia, and Middle Eastern efforts on counterbalancing Iran.

This study, then, offered a model for what the United States should ask of its allies and partners.

The study did not, however, address how Washington could best get them to actually contribute more to dealing with shared security challenges. In other words, Marathon’s last study focused on what Washington should want from its allies and partners, not how to actively get them to do these things.
PROBLEM STATEMENT

But there is a potential world of difference between what allies and partners might in theory do in accordance with what the United States prefers and what they might actually do. Even further, there is a world of difference between what they might do left to their own devices and what the United States, with its enormous potential leverage, might be able to induce them to do. Naturally, it is in America’s interest to get them to do more in ways consistent with future U.S. force structure in their respective theatres. In this light, the key question this study addresses is:

How can the United States best get its allies and partners to shoulder a greater portion of dealing with the security concerns that they share with Washington?

NATURE OF THE PROBLEM

This “burden sharing” dynamic is a longstanding issue for the United States. To be fair, the United States pursued a kind of free-rider strategy of its own for most of its national history, until 1917 effectively relying on Great Britain and others to ensure a balance of power in Europe, which was for many centuries the world’s primary theater. The United States contributed essentially nothing to that balance of power but rather focused on asserting its control over the North American continent and projecting power into neighboring areas, all while spending relatively little on defense.

The problem turned on the United States in the post-World War II era. Despite near-constant U.S. prodding and a number of serious intra-alliance crises, the European NATO states never spent what Washington regarded as an adequate amount on defense during the Cold War. A similar dynamic obtained with Japan. Burden sharing was a major issue between the United States and its allies for a number of reasons, most prominently Americans’ frustration at the perceived unfairness of inequitable spending and European failures to mount a sufficient conventional defense of NATO that would relieve the need for riskier nuclear strategies.¹

Because of this, the burden sharing problem received significant high-level and analytic attention during the Cold War. Most analysis from this period indicated that there were potent structural reasons behind the United States’ higher spending on defense relative
to most of its allies. The United States had a very powerful interest in deterring the
Soviet Union from gaining control of Western Europe or Japan and it was best-
positioned to ensure that outcome. At the same time, the efforts of its smaller allies were
relatively immaterial. Thus many states in Europe, even though they shared that
overriding U.S. interest, could take advantage of U.S. will and power to free-ride. Japan,
meanwhile, was relatively secure behind American maritime supremacy in Asia, and the
United States would defend it no matter what it did. Many U.S. allies gambled they
would be protected despite free-riding – and they were ultimately right.²

The burden sharing problem became a far less acute concern with the collapse of the
Soviet Union. The USSR’s demise resulted in a “unipolar” situation in which the United
States essentially alone, along with relatively modest contributions from a few allies like
the United Kingdom and Australia, could handle the range of military challenges to its
alliance network, and do so at a fraction of defense spending levels it had sustained
during the Cold War. In the post-Cold War period, then, burden sharing ceased to be a
major issue, even though most U.S. allies sharply decreased their defense efforts from
Cold War levels.

Today, however, the situation is much different in ways that have made the burden
sharing issue take on renewed importance, both as a strategic matter and as a source of
intra-alliance political friction which itself could have strategic ramifications. The
United States can no longer hope to take on the range of military threats to its alliance
network largely on its own, even with significant increases in defense spending that in
any case cannot be presumed.³ In particular because of the rise of a new superpower
rival in China along with the persistence of other threats from Russia, Iran, North
Korea, and transnational terrorism, the range and scope of threats substantially
outpaces the United States’ own resources to deal with them.

This is not just a matter of resources and military capacity. If an unequal arrangement
stretches too far the ability and/or resolve of the burden-shoulering state to take care
of the threats posed to the alliance or coalition, it risks that state sloughing off its
contributions to or even abandoning the alliance entirely.
APPROACH

Like Marathon’s previous study, this study frames the problem as a whole through an essentially “realist” lens – not a narrow or doctrinaire one, to be sure, but based on the idea that states are generally self-interested and security-optimizing. This is not a perfect guide or predictor of state behavior; it is, rather, a simplifying heuristic to formulate strategy and policy in a complex world. Viewed through this realist lens, states generally tend toward pursuit of their own interests. In that context, security—a direct military threat—is the most compelling form of interest and thus the most potent driver of state behavior.

By the same self-interested logic, though, states tend to seek to pursue and protect their interests in as inexpensive and safe fashion as possible. When possible, they will tend to want to do and risk as little as possible to achieve their goals. In an alliance or coalition framework, this creates a “free-rider” dynamic. Free-riders are states that do or risk little because they judge that others will, for one reason or another, largely take care of the problems for them.

In light of this logic, the previous study recommended aligning U.S. “asks” of its allies and partners with their conception of their interests. Instead of trying to fully align its perception of its interests with those of its allies, the United States should seek to work with the grain of their existing interests, focusing them more on tasks that they are, on realist grounds, more likely to be motivated to address anyway. Based on this framework, the study laid out a categorization for how to think about the roles of allies and partners in the Indo-Pacific and in Europe.

Now that we are addressing how the United States can actively seek to induce its allies and partners to do more, though, we must complicate this realist perspective. The high-level realist approach to state behavior has the advantages of parsimony and simplicity and is generally reliable in predicting the broad, long-term outlines of state behavior. But in this study we need to go into more detail and nuance, because the whole point of the study is that the United States should not be content merely with simply passively wait and hope for what states’ own threat perceptions and security calculations will yield. Rather, the United States will want to optimize the efforts of its allies.

In simpler terms, the United States will want to convince or pressure its allies to do more. It will want to actively seek to produce more and more aligned effort from them.
The burden sharing issue takes on its urgency because simply waiting passively for the realities of international politics to lead allies and partners to do more may, and likely will, not yield anything like an optimal outcome. Some U.S. allies do not perceive themselves as particularly threatened, sometimes with justification, so relying on their perception of the threat to motivate them will leave these significant sources of allied power untapped. Others face historical, political, or other factors that constrain their defense policies and levels of effort (or can be credibly presented as constraints). Still others may lack the resources needed to perceive threats accurately or clearly enough, which can inhibit their sense of the urgency of the situation.

Together these factors mean that a laissez-faire approach – one that simply relies on states to perceive security threats and balance them – is unlikely to lead to sufficiently greater effort by U.S. allies and partners, or to enough effort in a timely manner. The time factor is especially significant because several potential U.S. adversaries may have strong incentives to move before the U.S. alliance network fully awakens and becomes more vigorous and cohesive. China, for instance, may see reason to strike out against U.S. allies or Taiwan precisely to collapse or short-circuit the formation of an anti-hegemonic coalition in Asia. Russia, meanwhile, may judge that a combination of its own efforts and lagging European defense spending and low resolve make the near-term an especially propitious time for action, even during or after the war in Ukraine. Comparable incentives toward nearer-term action may present themselves to North Korea and Iran, especially if U.S. forces become engaged against another rival.

Because of this dynamic, whether Taiwan spends more on defense and spends its resources wisely in sufficient time could make the difference as to whether it survives free of Chinese domination. Whether Japan assumes more of a role in its and possibly others’ defense could likewise be central to the whole viability of the anti-hegemonic coalition in Asia. And whether Germany steps up to greater responsibility for NATO European defense soon enough could also be critical for the fate of NATO, and the U.S. ability to shift focus to Asia while mitigating resultant risks in Europe.

The problem, in simple terms, is that many allies do not think they are in danger to increase their share of the load, or cannot or will not mobilize the resources with the urgency needed to address the threat. The United States has spent years encouraging to see threats like Washington does and do more. But these pleas have not borne enough to match the threats to Washington’s alliance network. Looking forward, there seems little reason to think that this approach will pay off better than it has in the past.
 Accordingly, the United States needs its allies and partners to take greater action and responsibility sooner than a laissez-faire approach is likely to yield. Thus deliberate action by the United States on burden sharing could well prove critical.

**PURPOSE OF THIS STUDY: STRATEGIC FRAMEWORK**

The purpose of this study is to provide *a strategic framework* which the United States can use to lead to better burden sharing outcomes. Like Marathon’s previous study, this study’s purpose is not to come up with operational-level policies. Rather, it is primarily to provide a framework for approaching the overall problem, one that in turn will enable the United States to develop strategies and policies that should lead to greater and more aligned efforts by Washington’s allies.

**FACTORS: WHY STATES DECIDE TO ACT OR NOT ON SHARED SECURITY CHALLENGES**

In order to understand how the United States might best induce its allies and partners to do more, we need to understand to a more nuanced degree what drives their decisions about defense spending and level of effort. Approaching the problem in this way will enable us to understand better what motivates their decisions, and thus to develop more tailored and effective strategies for influencing them. In other words, once we understand more clearly and in more refined form why a country within the U.S. alliance network is or is not “pulling its weight,” then we can better tailor strategies to try to get them to do more.

The reasons why countries make decisions about their level of defense efforts and how they focus such efforts are, of course, myriad. But explanations tend to boil down to several categories of factors:

- **Security perceptions:** Through this lens, states decide about defense spending, effort, and strategy based on the threats they judge that they face. This is the lens most consistent with *realism*.
  - If this lens is correct, measures intended to increase allies’ perception of the threat they face, whether directly such as by illuminating threats they
might otherwise not appreciate or indirectly by increasing their exposure to those threats, will be especially effective.

- **Political/ideological conception or framing:** Through this lens, states decide about defense spending, effort, and strategy based on their dominant ideology or political conception. This lens is most consistent with international relations liberalism and constructivism.
  - If this lens is correct, measures to shift allies’ political-intellectual context, activate their ideological motivations, or otherwise alter their ideological or political framing or milieu will be especially effective.

- **Economic and powerful group interests:** Through this lens, states decide about defense spending, effort, and strategy based on their economic interests and stakes for competition between key interest groups. This lens is most consistent with bureaucratic politics and economic-focused interpretations of international politics.
  - If this lens is correct, measures to ensure that increased defense spending bear economic fruit for key interest groups within allied societies will be especially effective.

As noted previously, this study at the highest level of generality takes a broadly “realist” approach. But in the real world all three lenses reflect elements of truth – states act for multiple reasons that these three broad categories cover. Indeed, these factors are not mutually exclusive, and their relative salience may depend on context.

In the tradition of Graham Allison’s *Essence of Decision*, this study will use all three heuristics to identify strategic approaches the United States might profitably employ to achieve better burden sharing outcomes. The purpose of this study is not to “prove” one or the other theory right, as in a scholarly project. Rather, the purpose is pragmatic for U.S. policy: Recognizing that each lens uncovers elements of truth, examining what each heuristic indicates about key factors driving state behavior and, from that examination, ascertaining how the United States can develop integrated strategies keyed to these factors. Indeed, in many cases, these levers can be employed concurrently and even in a complementary fashion.
REALIST LENS: PERCEPTIONS OF THE THREAT

The realist perspective contends that states act primarily based on their security interests, and that they seek to gain resources and avoid costs and risks when possible. Viewed through this lens, then, a state will decide to contribute more to collective defense above all if it determines that doing so is necessary to secure its own important interests; otherwise, it is more likely to try to free ride, relying on others to bear the greater share of costs and risks associated with that defense. Accordingly, the United States can influence its allies’ defense efforts either by increasing their perception of threat (a more subjective approach) or by increasing the actual threat they face (the objective reality). Further, the United States can increase the actual threat they face either directly or indirectly.

REALIST STRATEGY I: CHANGING AN ALLY’S PERCEPTION OF THE THREAT

Increasing a state’s perception of the threat it faces involves persuading an ally that it should see its peril as actually greater than it has previously assessed. The premise of this approach is that the ally may not perceive the scale of the threat it faces accurately or sufficiently, and thus that U.S. policy can profitably work to change the ally’s assessment. If the United States can convince the ally that it faces a greater threat than it had previously appreciated, this should lead to greater effort by the ally.

This approach can reflect the actual threat reality to a greater or lesser degree. In theory, the United States can hype threats to its allies to induce greater effort, but this is unlikely to be a good strategy, especially over time. More constructively, the United States can try to work with an ally’s perception of the actual threat, for instance by providing a clearer, more detailed, or more forceful picture of the scale or pointedness of threats to the ally. This approach can include steps such as making greater effort to explain the threats to key audiences in the allied country or revealing more information, including intelligence information, about it.

This might make a difference in some circumstances because allies may actually not correctly or adequately understand the threats they face. In Europe, for example, many allies arguably failed to understand the gravity of the threat Russia posed to them. Such deficits can stem from a variety of sources, including an inadequate analytic/intelligence apparatus or an unsophisticated or naïve approach to international affairs. For instance, it is possible that Taiwan has underspent on defense in part because of an
inadequate intelligence and military analytic apparatus and because of naïve or biased assessments of the role of military forces in China’s strategy.

While this perception-oriented approach may help on the margins, though, it is unlikely to make a material difference in the more difficult burden sharing cases of highest importance to the United States. Countries like Japan and Germany have large and sophisticated government apparatuses, and the United States regularly shares detailed threat analyses with these allies. Yet the burden sharing problems remain. Indeed, it was not the sharing of intelligence by the United States that resulted in countries in Europe, like Germany, to announce defense spending increases – it was Russia’s actual invasion, a shift in the objective reality of the security situation. For these reasons, while the United States should make every appropriate effort to ensure allies’ threat perceptions align to the best assessment of reality, including by sharing sensitive information with key audiences in allied countries, this approach alone is unlikely to be sufficient.

REALIST STRATEGY II: ALTERING OR MANIPULATING THE ACTUAL THREAT AN ALLY FACES

A second method by which the United States can act to change an ally’s perception of the threat it faces is more concrete: by altering the actual degree of threat the ally must confront. The premise of this approach is realism at its most basic: If states are only likely to do more for their defense in response to an actual increased peril, then only a real increase in the threat they face will result in such action. As a result, this approach counsels knowingly causing an increase to the ally’s vulnerability.

Importantly, though, we can break such action into two categories: direct and indirect measures.

- **Direct measures.** Direct measures involve direct threats or hostile actions against the security or interests of the ally by the United States.
- **Indirect measures.** Indirect measures to increase an ally’s vulnerability are steps by the United States that are not direct acts or measures against the ally but still have the effect of decreasing its security.

For a variety of compelling reasons, this study will not consider the option of employing direct military action or manifestly hostile threats against an ally. Rather, it will focus
on indirect measures, which are likely to be an especially relevant and productive field for U.S. burden sharing strategy.

Indirect measures’ potency and appeal stem from the fact that the United States has immense power over its allies’ security, and this power means that it can modulate the degree of threat allies face, even without directly hostile action. This approach therefore has the virtue of affecting the ally’s core realist calculus while, generally speaking, being less confrontational or adversarial than directly hostile actions.

Such indirect measures are especially material in relations between the United States and its allies because of the particular role the United States plays in its alliance network. The United States is not only the leader of that overall alliance network, but it is the primary or at minimum very significant security provider for most of its allies. Indeed, at this point many U.S. allies would have difficulty defending themselves against determined assault without the United States. Moreover, the countries that are most problematic from a burden sharing point of view have tended to be the ones that are most dependent on the United States for their security – this is true in varying ways of Japan, Germany, and Taiwan.

*Direct Realist Strategy: Pulling Out of an Alliance*

The most extreme form of indirect measure is the U.S. threat to terminate its alliance with a laggard ally. While such a move is not a directly hostile act, since it does not involve the direct threat of violence against the ally, it is the most dramatic form of indirect measure as it involves fully removing U.S. protection. The burden sharing logic of this approach works based on the premise that the recalcitrant ally would prefer to bear the costs of increasing its defense efforts rather than lose its alliance with Washington, with all the attendant consequences for the ally’s security. This potency and directness also make it perhaps the most intuitive tool the United States has in its diplomatic inventory to try to motivate a laggard ally. President Trump’s threats to exit the NATO alliance can be seen as an example of this approach.

The appeal of this approach is its directness, simplicity, and potency. The threat of withdrawal plainly and clearly relates to the source of the American complaint – the ally is not doing its part for the security bargain with the United States, so the United States by rights can withdraw that protection. In other words: If a country is not pulling its
weight for its own or the collective defense, why should the United States provide for its security? This makes it a credible negotiating tool – as in diplomatic negotiations, the tighter the intuitive linkage between the problem, the threat, and the proposed redress, the more potent and effective that threat tends to be. Moreover, the consequences of fulfilling the threat to withdraw from an alliance are serious and, for many states, grave and even existential. The fact that European NATO states have in fact materially increased their defense spending in recent years after President Trump’s pressure but before Russia’s invasion of Ukraine lends credence to arguments for this approach’s efficacy.12

There are significant downsides to the approach, however. One is the fact that following through on the threat will in many cases be ill-advised for the United States, which makes it both unattractive as a risk and also harder to make credible as a negotiating strategy. This is because the United States has its own reasons for forming and sustaining alliances, including allies’ wealth and productive capacity, their latent military potential, geography, basing access, political weight, and so forth.13 Insufficient efforts by the ally do not necessarily make those alliances no longer worthwhile. For instance, Japan is by most measures the most important U.S. ally, certainly in the Asia-Pacific, because of its size, economic prowess, latent military capability, and geography, even though it is one of the most problematic U.S. allies from a burden sharing point of view. A similar reality holds in the case of Germany. In some cases, for instance Taiwan, the laggard behavior of the ally may cause the demerits and risks of sticking with the alliance (or in Taiwan’s case, quasi-alliance) to outweigh its benefits, but this is rather rare.

Another demerit of threatening to withdraw from an alliance as a burden sharing strategy is that it is often hard to cleanly segregate abandoning one ally and not others. This is true both from a strictly military as well as a political vantage point. For instance, if the United States pulled out of its alliance with Germany that would, given the U.S. basing and logistics architecture centered in Germany, undermine its ability to aid Poland and the Baltics – which, by the way, have done far better at pulling their weight. Likewise, the United States relies heavily on its bases in Japan for its military position in Asia. Taiwan is more severable than many of the other problem states in the U.S. alliance network but, even here, abandoning Taiwan would seriously compromise America’s military defense of Japan, the Philippines, and South Korea. This too reduces the attractiveness of this approach for burden sharing purposes and also its credibility as a negotiating strategy.
Meantime, pulling out of an alliance with an ally would likely also cause serious disquiet or even panic among other allies. This disquiet could be useful if motivating, but it could also trigger neutralizing or bandwagoning behavior among allies and non-aligned states, the latter of which could play an essential role in American strategy, as in the case of non-aligned states that may choose to enter an anti-hegemonic coalition against China.

As noted, for these reasons, this strategy is also hard to make credible. Allies can perceive that fully withdrawing from alliances would be damaging, if not self-defeating, for the United States and consequently judge that threats to do so are likely to be a bluff or that, even if pursued under one administration, could be — and likely would be — reversed under another. Indeed, this has happened from the Trump to the Biden Administrations. This diminishes the credibility and staying power and thus the efficacy of this negotiating strategy.

This relates to a final major downside of this approach as a negotiating strategy. Threats to withdraw from alliances inherently set up an all or nothing choice. Pulling out of an alliance is a dramatic, even extreme, act — particularly in contemporary diplomacy. For the United States, it essentially entirely abandons the security interest, which at some previous point was significant enough to be thought to justify an alliance commitment. Of course, sometimes pulling out of previous commitments will be advisable, or even necessary; indeed, this has been the case a number of times for the United States in recent years. But it generally makes sense to withdraw from an alliance commitment for reasons relating to the interest at stake, not discontent (however justified) with the lassitude of the ally in question. This means that such a dramatic act of abrogating the alliance will often be greater in strategic gravity than the burden sharing interest which, while significant, may be more of a limited interest compared to the consequences of a clean break with the ally. This too tends to undermine the credibility and thus efficacy of this strategy.

Indirect Realist Strategy: Changing the Way and Degree to Which an Ally Is Defended

A more useful lever for U.S. burden sharing strategy, though, lies in the way and degree to which Washington plans to defend an ally. This stems from a basic but essential point: defense is not an all or nothing proposition. Rather, the United States can offer an
ally a greater or lesser degree of protection. Decisions of how far and how much to defend an ally are not directly adversarial, but nonetheless can have a material, even major, effect on an ally’s security. They are thus an excellent source of leverage.

At its essence, this approach boils down to manipulating for conscious burden sharing effect how well and thoroughly to defend an ally. This is rooted in the reality that potential military strategies to defend an ally fall along a spectrum. Indeed, “defending” an ally is itself an imprecise term that can take many different meanings. Does defending mean preventing any hostile forces from coming upon the ally’s territory? This is of course the ideal, especially for the ally, but it can be a difficult and costly standard to meet against a capable opponent. More to the point, attempting a forward defense like this can be too taxing for the United States to achieve, risking not only the failure of the defense of a given ally but of other allies as well if too many forces are tied down, lost, or expended in such a far forward defense. On the other end of the spectrum, there is defense-in-depth, a strategy of trading space for time, initiative, or other advantages. This approach tends to be of greater interest to the United States, which can therefore react at the time and place of its choosing, trading increments of allied territory or security for overall advantage. And in between, there are a range of potential strategies that involve more or less emphasis on a forward defense as against a defense-in-depth.14

Even absent any burden sharing considerations, there is thus a basic tendency toward misalignment of interest between a given ally, especially allies nearer the periphery of the U.S. alliance architecture and closer to its major opponents, which naturally want to be completely and perfectly defended, and the United States, which has to consider the interests of its alliance system as a whole, including allies in other theaters, not to mention its own tolerance for cost and risk, and thus is likely to be inclined toward defenses in depth.15 From the perspective of reassuring an ally, this is a real problem. But, contrary to much U.S. rhetoric in recent decades, reassurance is not – or at least ought not be – the primary U.S. goal in its alliance relationships. Instead, optimal allied effort within a context of a well-defended alliance network is. Indeed, greater allied fear and anxiety can be beneficial if they contribute to greater effort without breaking the alliance.

In broadest brush, then, this approach would entail drawing back or credibly threatening to draw back from a forward defense of an ally toward something more like a defense-in-depth strategy. In general terms, it would involve planning to fight more by
trading allied space, territory, sacrifice, and resilience for military advantage – and adjusting force posture accordingly. This would mean at minimum not seeking to deny all attacks on an ally, but rather planning for the ally to “bear it” and fight on. For instance, allies could be expected to bear up under barrage or forms of blockade, even though the enemy would not be able to seize territory. Even more, though, it could actually trade territory for advantage, even with plans to eventually defeat the invasion. South Korea, for instance, was basically restored to its prewar territory at the end of the Korean War, but it had to endure two devastating invasions of its territory to reach that goal. At one point, North Korea occupied almost all of the country except for a small UN foothold around Pusan.

The upsides of this approach lie both in its flexibility and in its efficacy as a negotiating strategy. The approach is highly adaptable, allowing for a myriad of different decision points and levers across the range of military activity, including posture, war plans, and force development. In light of this, United States can develop tailored strategies using various different pressure points, many of which may be relatively easy to turn on and off, in order to bring pressure on the ally. Further, policymakers could amplify the threat of domestic interest groups and congressional caucuses pressuring an administration to exit alliances – suggesting that the most effective way to forestall these the political salience of these extreme outcomes is for allies to make the comparatively more “moderate” concession of greater defense spending. This adaptability makes the strategy both easier to execute for the United States but also less stressful for the alliance than a full withdrawal threat. This also makes it more credible as a negotiating strategy; as allies know the United States can readily implement and adapt such a strategy, they are more likely to be persuaded it will do so, increasing its credibility and thus potency in negotiations.

The approach also has the benefit of being intuitive and focalized. The approach clearly and tightly links the problem—lack of allied military level of effort or action—with the threatened penalty—a reduction in the degree of U.S. military protection—as well as its proposed solution: greater effort by the ally to enable restoring that higher degree of protection. It therefore intuitively links the problem, threatened penalty, and solution. As a general principle in negotiation, this sort of innate linkage and focalization is likely to result in better negotiating outcomes.16 In this vein, critical audiences relevant to the burden sharing issue with an ally are likely to see the U.S. steps and demands in line with this strategy as more reasonable and thus compelling. This is in turn means they
are more likely to accede to it or press others to do so. It is therefore likely to be the basis for a more potent negotiating strategy.

There are few obvious broad-brush downsides to this approach, as such. The downsides to the approach, rather, increase as the threatened retrenchment of the U.S. defense of the ally increases, as it would expose forward allies to subordination by rival powers. The more drastic the pullback in military strategy, the more controversial it will be, the more directly confrontational the approach will seem, and the more it will expose the ally to subordination by the U.S. opponent. Yet in some cases this more confrontational approach may be necessary to move the ally the strategic “distance” desired, especially since without their effort the subordination may happen anyway. Moreover, if the defensive umbrella is drawn back too far, the enemy may be induced to act in ways it otherwise would not to take advantage of the vacuum. Still, the benefit of this approach is how it lends itself to discriminate and adaptable measures; thus the United States can avoid going this far, or change course if it has.

There is, however, a critical condition for this strategy to work, which is that the ally can actually be rendered more vulnerable by the United States “thinning out” its defense. If an ally is secure even without a strong U.S. forward defense, then drawing its defense down will not matter, and thus will have little to no meaningful effect on the ally’s burden sharing behavior. This means the strategy will have little value in those cases where the ally is basically secure from plausible enemy action. There is little practical way to increase Portugal and Spain’s sense of vulnerability to Russian invasion, for instance, without essentially reducing the overall defense of Europe, let alone making other states that the United States may want to insulate from such pressure or even reward feel more vulnerable. While there may be more partial steps that might have some impact, for instance allocating scarce air and missile defense assets away from covering such countries, these steps may seem less worrying or painful to a country like Portugal or Spain than increasing defense spending at the cost of other fiscal priorities and perhaps even falling more in Russia’s crosshairs.

Given this, the most suitable countries for this burden sharing strategy are those are more “front line” – those that are more directly exposed to material enemy action, including of course direct invasion but also serious bombardment or blockade. This means that countries such as Taiwan, South Korea, Japan, the Philippines, Poland, and the Baltic states are more likely to be susceptible to this strategy than, for instance, the Iberian states, New Zealand, or Canada. Countries in a middle gray area would include
those that are not truly “front line” but still may be materially exposed such as, for instance, Germany, Denmark, the Czech Republic, and Romania.

Critical to the success of this approach is communicating not only the trajectory of U.S. defense protection if the ally does not comply but also the conditionality of the threat. The idea in this context would not be to fixedly shift to a defense-in-depth strategy, but rather to persuade the ally to do more for its own or collective defense by credibly demonstrating preparations to shift in that direction rather than sustaining a more forward defense. This threatened shift could be communicated to the ally through multiple channels, not just stating the intent as such in official channels but also through demonstrably adjusting war planning, changing exercises and training arrangements to reflect this shift, and posture adjustments. These steps would likely be important to convince the ally that the United States really was shifting to a more defense-in-depth approach, especially to counterbalance the historically strong American tendency to over-reassure.

It is worth emphasizing that this burden sharing strategy has strong historical precedent for the United States. Indeed, it was once a well-understood part of the U.S. alliance management playbook during the Cold War but fell into neglect during the unipolar period, when reassurance of allies took over as almost the exclusive lodestar in dealing with allies.

During the Cold War, though, leveraging the advantages from the potential for a more defense-in-depth approach was a central plank of U.S. policy toward its allies, particularly the West Germans, whose active participation in NATO defense was seen as vital. Accordingly, U.S. statecraft was designed to ensure a robust European and especially West German conventional defense of NATO. With rebuilding from the war and increasingly generous welfare states in Europe, this was not an easy sell.

But U.S. statecraft had leverage. Given West Germany’s critical importance, the United States was going to defend it from a Soviet Bloc offensive. But the United States could do so in different ways. Initially, the United States relied on a doctrine of massive retaliation. Any Soviet incursion into Western Europe would be met with a devastating, strategic nuclear response. Given the level of nuclear superiority the United States enjoyed over the Soviet Union, West Germany could be confident that this was a sufficient deterrent. However, the Soviet Union narrowed and eventually eliminated the gap in nuclear capabilities, prompting the United States to abandon massive retaliation
in favor of flexible response. This meant a limited war in Europe, including on West German soil was increasingly plausible and the focus of NATO defense planning.\textsuperscript{17}

In this context, the West Germans wanted a forward defense, both holding the line at or near the inner-German border and also preventing West Germany from turning once again into a battlefield. Yet the United States could plan to a defense-in-depth, using West Germany as a battlefield to attrit and defeat a Warsaw Pact offensive – including with tactical nuclear weapons. This offered military advantages to the United States and other NATO allies by trading space for time, advantage, and initiative. But of course West Germany did not want to be turned into a nuclear battlefield or abandon large portions of its territory.\textsuperscript{18} At least partly in response to these developments, West Germany turned the Bundeswehr into the most formidable military in Western Europe other than the United States’ own.\textsuperscript{19}

\textbf{CONCLUSION}

Among realist strategies, the indirect approach of altering the way an ally is defended likely offers the most productive field for the United States. Once an active part of U.S. alliance management, it has fallen by the wayside in the period of unipolarity. Now that the United States is once again in an era of great power rivalry in which it does not enjoy a preponderance of power, this approach should be reinvigorated. Perhaps more than any other approach identified in this paper, it bears further analysis linking specific burden sharing goals with U.S. military posture, plans, and the like, as well as diplomatic relationships. Tailored strategies employing this approach would be of great value to U.S. burden sharing goals in the coming years.
POLITICAL AND IDEOLOGICAL LENS

According to the realist lens, states act in response to threats to their security while seeking to economize on the risks and costs involved in addressing those threats. Other interpretations of international relations, however, contend that a—if not the—primary driver of state behavior is the ideological or political frame or orientation of the state. In this model, often associated with the liberal and constructivist schools of international relations theory, “regime type,” ideological motivation, and political affinity matter as much, if not more, than “realist”-style security considerations.

In the burden sharing context, this approach indicates that states that are politically aligned or properly motivated or persuaded will contribute far more to shared security challenges than ones that are not. Indeed, this model is the one that the United States itself has often tended to emphasize, at least rhetorically. The Biden Administration, for instance, has framed U.S. foreign policy and alliance management in particular as being about a “battle between democracy and authoritarianism,” at least in part in the hopes of eliciting greater allied effort.

Under this logic, then, the center of gravity for U.S. burden sharing strategy is the allied government’s ideological or political frame or commitments and, as it relates to that, the influence of the allied state’s populace. In a sense, whereas the realist approach acts upon fear, this approach acts upon an ally’s principles or convictions. The ally, in this model, will do more not simply because of the desire for self-protection, but also or even more because it believes it is the right thing to do. The key for burden sharing in this context, then, is to change the allied government’s ideological, political, or moral frame or commitments such that, because of this change, the ally contributes more to addressing common security challenges.

Using this model, we can usefully conceive of the ideological/political burden sharing approach as falling along a spectrum, ranging from direct intervention to change the allied government (the most extreme approach) to approaches focused on persuasion, in particular by altering the political/ideological context in which the allied government operates, causing it to change course on levels of defense spending or effort.
POLITICAL-IDEOLOGICAL STRATEGY I: DIRECT INTERVENTION IN ALLIES’ DECISION MAKING

If the center of gravity for an ally’s decision making is the political-ideological orientation and commitments of its government, then – all things otherwise equal – it follows that the United States should do what it can to promote governments in its allies led by parties or groups that are aligned or otherwise motivated to contribute to collective goals. And if the ally’s burden sharing behavior is important enough to U.S. and broader allied interests, this might be enough to warrant direct intervention to alter an ally’s government.

Regime Change

At this approach’s most extreme, this could involve trying actively to change an ally’s government, including by force or subterfuge. Posit an ally whose role in burden sharing/addressing shared security challenges is critically important for U.S. interests and those of Washington’s alliance network as a whole. If this ally is led by a government whose political orientation is leading it to avoid making greater efforts on shared security challenges or even to be moving in the opposite direction, for instance toward defection to an enemy coalition, this approach would counsel doing what is needed to change that government.

This is not unprecedented. During the Cold War, particularly its earlier stages, the United States played a role in rebellions and coups d’etat to bring in more favorable governments in a number of countries Washington considered important. In the case of Iran, this led to a quarter century-close relationship with the Shah’s government, whom the United States designated as its “regional sheriff” in the Middle East.22 The United States acted to change governments, with varying degrees of success, in several Latin American countries. In South Vietnam, the United States abetted the overthrow of Ngo Dinh Diem, who key leaders in Washington considered recalcitrant and misaligned with the American approach to the war. More recently, such a “regime change” logic was applied in the Middle East during the 2000s. The basic idea was that the development or imposition of more democratic governments would, by bringing their ideological commitments and goals more into line with those of the United States, resolve the security problems in the region.23
To apply this logic in the contemporary context: Many argue that there is an ideological alignment between certain parties and governments in Europe on the one hand and Moscow on the other. Hungary has received the most attention, but similar arguments have been leveled about the government in Poland as well as significant political movements in important European countries like the United Kingdom, France, and Italy. A similar logic could be applied in the case of the Philippines vis-a-vis China. The strongest form of the ideology-political framing approach, then, would counsel direct intervention to unseat misaligned governments and to install more aligned ones. If political orientation is so critical to determining a country’s future, and if the security situation is sufficiently dangerous, and if a country’s contributions to addressing these dangers are material enough, then the logical deduction is that Washington may need to act to change their governments.

The downsides to this approach are, though, manifest and, as a general rule at least, more compelling than its upsides. There are, of course, moral objections to forcibly or by subterfuge changing another state’s government, including in precisely the liberal-democratic moral framing that might often seem to justify or require it. More instrumentally, though, direct “regime change” is both difficult to make work in a sustainable way and often has significant blowback consequences that usually outweigh whatever gains accrue to the United States.

To the first point, while overthrowing a government may be feasible, the United States has found that replacing that government with one that is not only aligned but also competent and firmly-rooted has been difficult, as the experiences of Iraq, Afghanistan, and South Vietnam testify. At the same time, “regime change” efforts often result in major reputational blowback for the United States, both in the affected state itself but also in other countries that bristle at the idea of high-handed American interference. Thus solving one immediate problem of a misaligned government in an ally may create more problems than it is worth over time, not only in the country itself but beyond. The Iran experience is an object example of this point, where U.S. involvement in the 1953 coup has caused immense reputational damage for the United States, not only in Iran itself but around the world. Even just purely from a cost-benefit perspective, then, direct intervention to change an allied government will often, and likely normally, not make sense.

But this is not invariably true. Interventions by the Western Allies in Germany in the early 1930s to prevent the Nazi takeover or depose Hitler or by the Allied powers in the
early stages of the Russian Revolution or Civil War might well have averted far greater costs. That said, it is hard to find examples by the United States in recent decades of direct interventions to change an allied government that proved beneficial in the long term. Accordingly, it is unlikely to be worth the downsides involved for the United States to overthrow an allied government simply to improve allied burden sharing which, while important, is unlikely to outweigh the costs entailed.

Political Influence/Intervention

There is, however, a more moderate and constrained version of the direct approach. This is the use of non-violent and often (but not necessarily) open and legal action to support aligned parties or movements within an ally. In this approach, the United States can lend political support, money, expertise, and other resources and support to political forces within an ally that are committed to an aligned political or ideological framing, who are more likely to drive the ally to do more for shared security goals if they come to power. The United States took significant actions to influence the elections in Italy in the late 1940s and 1950s and in France in the late 1940s in order to avoid Communist takeovers of these critical countries, and these interventions are generally considered successes. Today, much of this kind of activity is now publicly and avowedly undertaken, for instance via institutions such as the International Republican Institute (IRI) and the National Democratic Institute for International Affairs (NDI).

The problem with this approach is its limited efficacy. More modest and constrained interventions that disavow the use of force or other aggressive maneuvers by their very nature constrain how much compelling power these interventions can muster. Thus constraining such actions by definition limits how coercive those actions can be. Even still, such limited and non-coercive interventions can still fail, whether simply by being ignored or actually provoking a countervailing reaction, for instance by generating a “butt out” instinct. For instance, President Barack Obama’s intervention in the Brexit vote in 2016—designed in part to ensure the United Kingdom remained an important U.S. ally in the European Union, and thus having, at least from Obama’s perspective, burden sharing implications—had little effect, and may well have backfired.
POLITICAL-IDEOLOGICAL STRATEGY II: PERSUASION, OR SHAPING THE ALLIES’ POLITICAL-IDEOLOGICAL CONTEXT

Another route to shift an ally’s political-ideological frame is less direct: to shape the political-ideological context in which the allied government operates such that it determines it should or must make greater contributions toward shared security challenges. This logic can involve simply persuading an allied government by dint of the power of argument. It is not very prudent to rely on this hope, however, since governments usually have strong reasons for their inaction. More relevantly, then, this approach involves altering the political, intellectual, and ideological context in which the allied government makes its decisions such that it decides to do more.

This context is important because allied governments will rarely be persuaded simply by arguments, however powerful. Most allied governments, and certainly those in large, advanced, democratic allies like Germany and Japan, have well-formed and reasoned views on key issues, including spending and defense. As a result, these governments grasp the burden sharing issues quite well. They understand the American “asks” on burden sharing; they just have historically not, for a variety of reasons, relented to them. Indeed in many, such as Germany and Japan, there are complicated coalition agreements that bind governments’ policies on national defense and spending.

Thus changes on burden sharing behavior will most likely be the result of a new government that is convinced of the rectitude or necessity of doing more, or a new political environment that induces or pressures the standing government to do more. Just as new measures on, for instance, law and order or climate or immigration may become possible with a change in the political environment, so too is this then the case in the arena of burden sharing. The increased focus on climate change and its consequent effect on public policy in the OECD nations is an instructive example of how changes in the political, ideological, or intellectual context can lead to significant changes in practical policy. The “Zeitenwende” discussion and debate in Germany can be seen as another example of such a new political-intellectual context, albeit one clearly driven by a change in the security environment. More broadly, while most countries increasing their defense spending are more exposed to Russia, there may be a normative effect that is impelling some governments to do more.

The key mechanism of this more indirect approach works by trying to favorably alter the political, ideological, intellectual, and normative environment in which governments
make these decisions. As a matter of negotiating approach, this normative-focused approach can involve both “carrots and sticks” – both the promise of validation and support (and thus rewards) as well as the threat of criticism and shaming (and thus punishment). As a result of this, allied governments may perceive it as newly necessary or advantageous to do more on the burden sharing front.

**Strategies**

Efforts to shift the political-ideological context for allies can usefully be grouped into five categories, based on the nature of the form of persuasion – the operative method by which the political, ideological, and/or intellectual context is altered. These categories are:

- **Obligation**, or duty, which is a focus on increasing an ally’s sense of duty to do more;
- **Legitimacy**, or the attempt to persuade an ally that burden sharing efforts are more morally valid than previously supposed;
- **Sympathy**, or the attempt to engage an ally’s moral imagination to do something which it is not strictly obligated to do;
- **Glory**, or the attempt to stir an ally to do more than it otherwise would through appeals to its pride and aspirations for grandeur; and
- **Power of example**, or the attempt to elicit greater allied effort by the inspiration stemming from their admiration for the example of American politics, life, prosperity, or some other facet.

Needless to say, these categories overlap and represent generic thrusts of approach rather than precisely delineated alternatives. Moreover, these strategies can be pursued together. But they are usefully separated conceptually as they involve materially distinct logics by which to persuade an allied government and/or key audiences it responds to do more.

**Obligation**

One method of eliciting greater allied effort is by persuading the ally and/or key audiences it must respond to at home and abroad that it has a meaningful obligation or duty of some kind to do more – in a sense, that the ally has an unmet debt. The logic of
this approach is that the ally will do more if it is persuaded or if others that matter to it come to believe that it is shirking a duty.

This is perhaps the most prominent form of political argument relating to burden sharing, at least in recent years – the idea that some countries, for instance Germany, have not been doing their “fair share.” This argument was also employed toward Japan during the First Persian Gulf War and afterwards with significant impact, as Japan was perceived as not having done “its part” during the conflict, which had a significant effect on post-Cold War Japanese policy.32

As a general principle, this approach seems likely to be more effective by generating outside (either foreign or domestic non-governmental) pressure to change an ally’s behavior rather than direct “guilt-tripping.” While it may work to call out an allied government directly for its “unpaid debt,” if an ally has been willing to shirk its obligations already, it is not clear why direct pressure would succeed in changing that calculation. Indeed, it may cause a backlash, as the pressure on Germany in recent years may have at least in part led to.

Highlighting to other audiences, including other allies, that the ally in question is not doing its part, however, seems more likely to be effective. These audiences can then bring greater pressure on the allied government. This is what happened with Japan during and after the Gulf War, for instance.

Legitimacy

A second method of trying to elicit greater allied effort is to seek to change perceptions of the legitimacy or morality of such an effort, both in the country itself as well as among other relevant audiences. This can be effective because, if a country’s population or neighbors believe its investing in addressing shared security challenges is immoral or illegitimate, that will constrain how much it is willing to do. Accordingly, efforts to increase the perception of its legitimacy should open up new levels of effort.

This is especially relevant in countries with dark military histories, particularly Germany and Japan. In the cases of both countries, both domestically and internationally there are many key audiences who believe greater military efforts, especially outside of their
borders, are illegitimate. Thus, changing the perception of the validity of greater German and Japanese efforts can help to enable greater effort.

This can be done in a number of ways, including directly by lauding greater efforts by such states. But it can also involve changing the framing of security issues. For instance, in both Japan and Germany there are strong strains of pacifism. Efforts to shift the political-moral frame away from pacifism toward a legitimization of collective defense can help to encourage greater burden sharing efforts.

Sympathy

A third method is to elicit greater allied effort by engaging the sympathies of that ally. This operates by “pulling at the heartstrings” of an allied government and/or population. Allies that see barbarities being committed by an adversary state, as is the case in Ukraine for instance, may become more willing to do more on shared security challenges as a result. A similar dynamic led to greater effort by the Western Powers in the two World Wars.

Countries’ susceptibility to this kind of sympathy varies. Great Britain and Canada, for instance, historically have strong strains of liberal or high-minded interventionism, as does the United States itself. Contrarily, Japan and South Korea do not. This does not mean that such arguments for sympathy cannot work in the latter category of states, but they are more likely to be effective in the former.

Glory

A fourth method is to try to rouse an ally through appeals to its aspirations for a greater international role. This can work because some countries have strong traditions elevating the importance of national stature, leadership, and grandeur. Consistent with the views of classical realists, this view of glory as a motivating factor goes farther than the strict, narrow security concerns that neorealism focuses on to include ideological conceptions of the value of a higher role for or for the standing of one’s country in the international system.

The United Kingdom and France, for instance, spend more on defense, use their militaries more, and take a far more active role in international relations than would
strictly be necessary simply because of their geographical and geopolitical circumstances. By common assessment, their behavior is in part a product of their pride in their grand pasts and their desire to perpetuate that legacy. The United States itself arguably does more in the world than strict necessity would require; its actions are likely driven in part by conceptions of America’s “role in the world.” Certainly commonplace references in the American foreign policy discussion to the importance of American “leadership” and the like testify to the prevalence of such ideas.

That said, not all countries with prominent histories are as susceptible to these arguments. Countries with darker histories like Germany and Japan may wish to distance themselves from those pasts. Meantime, some with significant histories may simply not have the interest, like Italy, Spain, and Portugal.

In this model, then, the United States would focus on making arguments to allies to do more based on their national legacies and the importance of their playing an elevated role. This strain of argument is likely to be particularly effective in encouraging France and Britain to take a greater role due to their proud national legacies. It could also be relevant to countries like Australia, Canada, and New Zealand with proud national pasts of contributions to collective defense.

*Power of Example*

A final method is perhaps the most indirect. In this model, the United States can try to induce greater allied contributions by modeling good behavior, drawing countries to do more with it and in furtherance of shared goals by their inspiration, admiration, and sense of shared purpose. This appears to be a core part of the Biden Administration’s approach to burden sharing. In this model, the United States would focus on doing things itself, including internally, that would be likely to catalyze such sentiments among key allies.

An example of this approach would be the strategic pressure within the United States to improve civil rights during the early Cold War. While the end of Jim Crow had multiple causes, some of the reason for its demise was the strengthening conviction that the United States could not afford such a shameful blot as it competed for influence with the Soviet Union around the globe. Countries, it was feared, would be less likely to collaborate with a United States that continued to tolerate Jim Crow.
The main practical challenge with this approach is that it enmeshes the burden sharing challenge with core domestic political debates. Leaving aside the merits of these various debates, burden sharing concerns are unlikely to take pride of place in such contests (nor, it should be stressed, should they necessarily do so). Further, placing primary stress on the “rallying effect” of a pure contest between democracies and autocracies is unlikely to be effective, as the recent ‘nonaligned movement’ on the Russo-Ukrainian War amongst developing world nations – especially in the critical Asian theatre – demonstrates. Americans are likely to prioritize their own views on these key domestic debates, making this a difficult strategy to pursue for burden sharing purposes, other than ex post facto.

CONCLUSION

Each of these political-ideology approaches is likely to be at least somewhat useful in some burden sharing problem cases. But which one or ones to emphasize in each instance will depend on the political, historical, intellectual, ideological, and broader context of the particular country and its foreign environment. Moreover, how much to use “honey” and how much to use “vinegar” will also depend on the political and even personality context of the leaders in question.

Looking at its suitability and also its upsides and downsides, perhaps the best thing that can be said of the political-ideological context approach is that it has few clear downsides. While senior leaders’ attention and time are, of course, scarce, talk is also cheap, and the United States has many avenues by which it can try to make these arguments.

That said, it is not clear how effective they are likely to be. The United States is rarely the driver of political and intellectual currents in other countries, and even more rarely in a positive way – indeed it is often the focus of skepticism and hostility. This limits how much the U.S. Government can reasonably expect to shape, let alone control, the conversation relevant to burden sharing.

What the United States can do, though, is to consistently message allies in ways that try to nudge the political-ideological context affecting them in an advantageous direction from a burden sharing perspective, and be ready at critical junctures when there is more receptivity or plasticity in key countries. For instance, the United States has for many
years urged Germany to do more on burden sharing, with relatively little success. The Russian invasion of Ukraine appears, however, to have provoked a fundamental rethinking of Germany’s security policies – the so-called “Zeitenwende.” It is unclear how lasting or significant that shift will be but U.S. or U.S.-backed efforts to shape the political-intellectual context both in advance of and as Germany makes key decisions about how much to spend on defense, support Ukraine and others in Eastern Europe, and the like could make a material difference. If nothing else, there is little downside to trying.
ECONOMIC AND INTEREST GROUP LENS

This lens is most consistent with the bureaucratic or interest-group lens of foreign policy interpretation. In this vein, states’ foreign policy decisions are not primarily driven by an abstract or averaged conception of “national interest” or ideology, but rather by the particular interests of key stakeholders within that state and how those interests interact. Different variants of this heuristic emphasize different elements. Some emphasize the interests of bureaucracies and their particular incentives. Others, especially in the Marxist vein, look more at the pecuniary interests of key interest groups. But the critical thread through these different approaches is that they look at the interests of sub-state actors, rather than – like conventional realism – focusing on the level of the state or – like liberalism – looking mostly at ideology.35

Through this lens, the direct measures most relevant to the burden sharing question are thus non-military in nature, primarily economic. While an alliance is ultimately about security, countries of course highly value their economic interests, which are both linked with and underwrite security interests.36 Especially given the importance of its economy (and especially its consumer market) to many key allies, the United States can therefore act to jeopardize or impair the economic interests of its ally or partner to try to induce it to do more on the burden sharing front.

Consequently, the third and final set of potential burden sharing tools are those that seek to shape the incentives of key sub-groups in both the public and private sectors to induce greater defense spending – both in overall terms, certainly, but especially in terms of outlays in force areas compatible with the strategic contributions and force structure Washington particularly desires.

This set of tools is also derived from basic realist logic: states are more likely to increase security investment if their interests are engaged. But it differs from standard realist theory in focusing below the level of the state, and rather on key interest groups – for instance within the political, bureaucratic, and especially business elite. This approach leads to focusing on how those groups see broader U.S. security interests as consistent with their own narrower interests. Indeed, recent scholarship on the political economy of EU defense spending has focused on sub-groups, especially defense contractors, as key and even determinative actors in setting the pace and constraints of policy relevant to burden sharing equities.37
At its most basic, this approach counsels that, if countries are going to do more on the burden sharing front, key interest groups within that country need to benefit. In simple terms, money and jobs need to flow to the country. This need will tend to be especially pronounced when the security threat is less acute. Ultimately this is a realist logic applied at the sub-unit level: key actors need to see benefit if they are to take costly action.

From this vantage, the way to elicit greater overall effort is to influence or even intervene in allies’ bureaucratic and political processes to more tightly align the trajectory of U.S. strategic efforts with key sub-group interests. This approach can be pursued in one of two basic ways: inducing alignment positively by deploying economic and policy incentives to align elite economic interests, especially those of in-country defense contractor interests, with burden sharing goals, or alternatively, in specific cases where the bilateral economic relationship provides sufficient leverage, by inducing alignment negatively by imposing sanctions on key swing or “kingmaker” industry coalition members, the suspension of which would be clearly linked to increased defense spending or more vigorous effort by the ally.

**POSITIVE ALIGNMENT**

The first method acts primarily to positively induce the alignment of key political and economic sub-group interests with increasing security-related expenditures and procurements in ways that are compatible with U.S. aspirations. The premise of this approach is that allies and partners may face political constraints within their own budget processes – such as pressures for expanded domestic social services or infrastructure priorities – that disincentivize proposing increases in security-related spending.

*Positive - Direct Support*

In applicable cases, the United States can intervene creatively to align broader defense spending increases more tightly and profitably with the narrower economic interests of key elite interest groups. In contrast to conventional military-geoeconomic hybrid approaches that favor negotiating U.S. arms sales to allied nations – a practice that privileges *American* defense companies – Washington could undertake measures that privilege *in-country* defense industries, thereby creating a key political constituency with a material interest in boosting spending levels.
This logic is based on a simple proposition. If allies are to do more, key interest groups need to benefit through more money and more jobs. The most obvious such interest groups are defense and defense-related companies and their employees. If allies are to do more, this logic suggests providing positive inducements to sustain and grow such interest groups. Countries like Japan and France, for instance, have established defense industries. If these groups were incentivized and empowered by U.S. positive inducement, that could help drive greater effort by Tokyo and Paris – as well as in their immediate regional market areas. Germany’s defense industry, meantime, has largely atrophied. If Berlin is to do more, though, this logic indicates that supporting the growth of German defense and defense-related industries will be key.

Additionally, many key partners have an interest in developing their own defense primes – especially Taiwan, which is motivated by increasingly acute threat perception and domestic political sensitivities, and India, whose interest in decreasing its reliance on Russia military equipment has likely become pressing in light of sanctions and the optical consequences of the Russo-Ukrainian War, not to mention that fact that New Delhi has a standing economic interest in pathways toward greater industrialization.38

The same may hold in a different way for the United Kingdom, which like the United States has a political culture recently reawakened to the deleterious economic consequences of deindustrialization, especially in particular regions. Renewed industrial activity, fueled by greater defense spending, could become a key platform plank for either major UK political party. In both of these nations and others, a U.S. government-backed funding option could neatly fill these kinds of incentive gaps in both a timely and politically palatable manner, allowing mature in-country partner defense industries to begin fulfilling procurement orders on a shortened timeline and, for under-developed and under-capitalized in-country partner defense industries, providing a much-needed financial aegis.

How would this work in practice? Obviously too much direct stimulus would defeat the point of burden sharing; providing too many resources or support would turn allied defense efforts into a vehicle for higher American defense spending. Thus the logic here would be to employ asymmetric or high “bang for the buck” devices by the United States to generate greater returns by allies. For example, the U.S. government could functionally expand the real purchasing power of foreign defense budgets by structuring and purchasing special class bonds/financial vehicles directly from foreign defense
primes. If packaged with terms excluding use of proceeds for systems incompatible with U.S. re-posturing efforts, these financial vehicles could drive down the per-unit cost of procurements that are consistent with broader U.S. strategic interests. In the longer run, the United States could also provide or support the provision of seed grants or investments to new defense companies and new defense projects in friendly countries.

Perhaps most significantly, the United States could also open its own defense market more to allied companies. Because of its enormous scale, such market access could provide additional major stimulus to allied spending in addition to their own greater expenditures. Thus, instead of focusing only on “buy American” in its defense procurement, the United States could seek to induce greater defense effort by allied countries by giving them more opportunities to make money and gain jobs by selling into the huge U.S. defense market. This might well present equity and fairness issues for the United States, though, so the United States could ensure this was reciprocal open access, at least over time.

This positive-direct support approach may be especially relevant now. Even as foreign political climates become more favorable to increased defense expenditure in response to the Russo-Ukrainian War, especially in Europe, this positive alignment approach could prove useful in locking in or driving critical burden sharing transitions. Even as European nations, most notably Germany, have laudably signaled intent to increase defense expenditure as a share of GDP, there is a crucial operational gap between “talk” and “walk.” It is possible that if and when the Ukraine conflict comes to a resolution or even becomes protracted, and the combined economic consequences of extant sanctions and the global inflationary environment continue exerting upward economic and price pressures on voters and businesses, politicians will likely be under mounting pressures to either undertake austerity measures or reallocate a greater proportion of national budgets to domestic economic relief and social programs. Further, there has been early indication that in-country defense primes – particularly in Europe – might face a lengthy and difficult process to secure funding from European banks, which are subject to complex environmental and social governance (ESG) governance laws that disfavor defense. The United States can and should ameliorate that funding gap. In such an environment, U.S. efforts to essentially ensure that key interest groups have a vested interest in higher allied defense spending.
Positive – Indirect Support: Domestic

The United States can also generate indirect support by providing key in-country sub-groups – outside of the defense industry and military proper – with incentives that could be exchanged for their political support of greater defense-related efforts. For example, the United States could offer a given country’s major export industry – and the political capital it controls – greater market access or its preferred regulatory modifications in exchange for its support of greater in-country defense expenditure. Whereas the Positive – Direct approach would focus its efforts exclusively on the in-country defense industry and its key sub-groups, the Positive – Indirect approach would focus on non-defense “kingmaker” sub-groups and political blocs. For example, as part of the Dodge Plan reforms in post-war Japan, the United States opened its markets to Japanese automobiles as part of a broader effort to re-industrialize the country, creating the scale necessary for Japanese manufacturing to support the American effort in the Korean War.41

Ideally, this method would be deployed in conjunction with Positive – Direct Support for in-country defense primes. As a tandem, they would increase the purchasing power of foreign militaries at two levels – both at the topline and per-unit-cost levels. They could also be deployed sequentially and conditionally. In other words: in a negotiation with Japan, for example, in exchange for support for greater topline defense spending, a Positive – Direct Support for Japanese defense primes could be packaged with a favorable U.S. natural gas and oil purchase agreement to supply dominant Japanese export conglomerates.

Positive - Indirect Support: Foreign

As a final positive approach, the United States can also generate indirect bandwidth for greater defense spending by providing key foreign, or non-U.S. sub-groups outside the target country, especially foreign defense primes that are primary exporters for the target country, with greater support. For example, the Korean defense industry has seen recent success in securing contracts for light combat aircraft (LCA) from the Philippines.42 Deploying subsidies or financial vehicles to reduce the costs and prices of key foreign defense suppliers would, in real terms, expand the per-unit purchasing power of the target country’s defense budget. To take the above example, rather than attempting to force Manila into a purchase agreement with American defense primes, which might make for difficult political optics, Washington can quietly build on the
extant Korean-Filipino purchase relationship by providing positive support for Korea Aerospace Industries (KAI) and other Korean primes, thus reducing the per unit cost of items that are to be purchased by the Philippines and align with U.S. strategic requirements – in effect indirectly supporting Manila’s defense budget and greater burden sharing by the Philippines. A similar model could be replicated elsewhere.

NEGATIVE ALIGNMENT

The second broad method of aligning political and economic sub-group interests with increasing security-related expenditures and procurements is a negative one. That is, this method would seek to impose punitive measures on allies and partners – and in particular on those key interest groups that drive state decisionmaking on burden sharing issues – for failing to adequately increase expenditure or make needed contributions. The premise of this approach is that there may be insufficient prospects for positively aligning the sub-group interests of allies and partners, or that such efforts at positive alignment have proven unsuccessful. This approach, then, seeks to use negative stimuli to shape the incentives of key interest groups to change the ally’s behavior. Just as the positive approach is targeted toward key interest groups, then so is this negative approach also targeted to affect their cost-benefit calculus.

Direct Negative Alignment and Indirect Negative Alignment – Domestic

The most straightforwardly negative method the United States can employ in this vein is to impose sanctions or tariffs of various kinds on allies. The logic of this approach is to impose economic costs on the ally – and particularly those interest groups that can shift the allies’ calculus on defense spending – significant enough to change its calculus about whether to do more for shared security goals. U.S. sanctions and tariffs against a variety of allies under the Trump Administration were linked to burden sharing demands from Washington. Using such a method against a given country takes two basic forms. A direct negative approach would focus solely on a given country’s defense industry and military such as withholding support, technology transfers, or blocking sales of requested weapons systems. An indirect negative-domestic approach, meanwhile, would focus on sub-groups within the country’s broader economic environment; relief from tariffs and regulatory penalties levied against these sub-groups could be linked to support for greater in-country defense expenditure.
The **upside** of employing economic sanctions is that it inflicts costs on the ally, making real and credible the United States’ seriousness about getting the ally to do more and creating material incentives for the ally to comply. It also avoids acts that are outright hostile or violent, but rather uses tools that are, while contentious, not forbidden or even necessarily uncommon among even partnered states. At the same time, economic sanctions as a tool offer enormous flexibility and adaptability. The sanctions can thus be targeted to try to focus the pain inflicted.

The **downside** of this approach, however, is that it causes friction, sometimes intense, between the United States and the ally. While not necessarily hostile, the imposition of sanctions is certainly unfriendly, and thus can cause serious tensions, if not fissures, in the alliance. More broadly, the imposition of such costs may have the effect of framing the dispute as an attempt by the United States to *compel* its ally to do more on burden sharing. This can have the effect of triggering a nationalistic, “don’t tread on me” or “don’t boss me around” response from the ally. This seems to have been at least part of the response from Germany to pressure during the Trump Administration.44 Moreover, the allied state may have levers of its own to pull to contravene the United States in its burden sharing strategy, not only that are economic in nature but relating to military posture, access approvals, and the like. Further, economic sanctions on the whole have a decidedly mixed record, though they tend to be more successful when their purpose is more targeted and incremental.45

Direct *negative* economic measures, then, seem most likely to be effective under certain conditions, especially when they can be targeted on points of particular influence, are conditional, and where the United States enjoys significant economic leverage. It is not an accident that these tend to track the conditions under which sanctions are most likely to be effective in general.46 Targeted measures that focus the cost inflicted on those that have the power to shift burden sharing policies but do not activate a widespread negative response in the allied country are likely to be less costly in terms of allied cohesion and less likely to precipitate a broad “don’t tread on me” reaction. Meantime, sanctions that are clearly conditional and focused are likely to seem more reasonable and acceptable than ones that are more vague or expansive, which are likely to seem more antagonistic. And the United States is more likely to induce better allied burden sharing with direct economic measures when it has significant economic leverage over the ally.
This suggests that economic measures are likely to be most effective when employed against smaller or more fragile economies or those highly dependent on the United States that also face at least some degree of serious threat. In these conditions, the United States has a lot of leverage, and the ally is already likely to be primed to do more, so the ask of the ally is more incremental. Contrarily, economic sanctions against larger states like Germany and Japan are likely to be less effective, especially when they involve demands for broad changes like substantially increased defense spending.

Measures that would be significant enough to affect such large states are likely to be more disruptive in the overall relationship, while smaller measures are unlikely to make much difference, not least because these large economies have significant alternatives to American trade. Comparable difficulties are likely to present themselves in using direct economic measures against smaller states that are not plausibly vulnerable, for instance, like the Benelux countries. While the United States might have more leverage over these states, the political “distance” required to move them is likely to be too great for sanctions that are not too disruptive to be worthwhile, especially given these states’ connections with other European states.

Although these models should be tailored and adapted to individual countries, the same dynamics tend to apply at the sub-unit level as well. Targeted sanctions and tariffs are likely to be most plausibly and effectively deployed against minority sub-unit coalition members or those with marginal power within governing coalitions, a fact that severely constrains the number of cases where deploying them might yield favorable results. For example, in the case of France, it would likely be more profitable to employ punitive measures against sub-groups attached to some permutation of minor industries (as a percentage of GDP), such as the luxury goods and wine industries, rather than those attached to the comparatively more powerful financial or pharmaceutical sectors. A similar dynamic might attain among military sub-groups as well. In nations with relatively more distributed power sharing between branches, purchase and tech transfer refusals are better deployed against comparatively weaker branches than stronger ones.

Deploying punitive measures against majority industries or the most powerful political sub-groups should be a last resort, given that there is a high risk of a “don’t tread on me” reaction. Additionally, from a domestic U.S. political perspective as has been seen with the recent U.S. sanctions regime against Russia, given that deploying such tools might have a “blowback” impact on the American economy, their usage in the future will and should be subject to intense intra-executive branch debates.47
**Indirect Negative Alignment – Foreign**

As a final *negative alignment* approach, the United States can also penalize key foreign interest groups that key in-country sub-groups rely upon as inputs for their own material or political interests. For example, the United States could place sanctions or tariffs on Gulf state oil exports that German heavy manufacturers might increasingly rely upon for production processes due to the Russo-Ukrainian War. Such an approach, if carefully constructed, might serve to enlist Gulf oil exporting sub-groups to apply pressure on their German sub-group counterparts to support greater defense efforts.

This approach could also feature a pairing of direct U.S. sanctions with those of another partner. The German steel industry, for example, relies upon hard coal – domestic subsidies for which were suspended in 2018 – and imports most of it from Russia (45.4%), the United States (18.3%), and Australia (12.3%). Whether Germany’s announcement that it will cease purchase of Russian coal in August 2022 actually is executed or not, the United States and Australia could agree to suspend their own coal exports, pressuring the German steel industry to leverage their political capital into a negotiation for increased defense expenditure.

This approach could also feature a pairing of direct U.S. sanctions with those of another partner. The German steel industry, for example, relies upon hard coal – domestic subsidies for which were suspended in 2018 – and imports most of it from Russia (45.4%), the United States (18.3%), and Australia (12.3%). Such an approach can be high risk as it can arouse the ire of sub-groups in two or more different countries that the United States might need to negotiate with. However, if employed in an acute and focused way to precipitate a crisis-style negotiation for a defense boost, it could prove effective.

**CONCLUSION**

Whether deployed alone or in combination, each of these approaches is likely to be at least somewhat useful in some burden sharing problem cases. Though there are general guidelines that apply across cases, it is worth emphasizing that any method or methods brought to bear have to be carefully tailored to the machinery of sub-group interactions, both business and political, within a given country – even down to the level of understanding key company’s executives and their familial connections. Further and relatedly – as inter-national economic networks are more tightly bound than political
ones – the spillover effects and “externalities” of using geoeconomic tools need to be carefully considered in the context of the economic “web” a country is a part of.

Considering its suitability and also its upsides and downsides, the clearest positive of the economic and interest group approach is that it both leverages the United States’ greatest non-military strength – its economy, and in particular the U.S. dollar’s reserve status – to great effect. Further, it approaches burden sharing questions at a level of dexterity that extends beyond and in some ways underwrites the political realm proper. These attempts, particularly in the monetary policy sphere, to cajole and coax key foreign sub-groups can have powerful amplifying effects in the distribution of national power.

Geoeconomic tools declined in popularity in the neoliberal era and, to the degree that they have been revived in U.S. policymaking circles, have been used mostly in punitive terms. Subsidies and financial vehicles as direct support for foreign sub-groups, especially those attached to foreign defense primes, represent a promising approach to suit new burdensharing realities and imperatives.

The financial power of the United States is not only the province of the private sector – nor, in the public sector, of the Federal Reserve or trade negotiators. The Department of Defense can use these tools at the foreign sub-group level to push burden sharing in an advantageous direction. As with the above lenses, timing is often of the essence: such tools can be pre-prepared for deployment at critical junctures when there is more receptivity or plasticity in key countries. As the global economy reels from both Covid-induced supply chain effects, war-induced commodity shocks, and multifocal inflationary pressures – the United States, as the world’s sole financial superpower, currently finds itself in a unique window to nudge vulnerable foreign sub-groups in the right directions on burden sharing questions.
APPENDIX: KEY COUNTRY ANALYSIS

The United States has dozens of allies. But it is worthwhile to focus the study on a smaller number of countries. This is not only for purposes of study scoping. Rather, the reality is that not all U.S. allies and partners are equally important or relevant to the United States in the burden sharing context. Some are simply more significant than others.

These more significant allies are those that are either: a) more powerful, or b) more vulnerable. Powerful states have the resources to dedicate to shared defense challenges. Vulnerable states in the U.S. alliance network, meanwhile, are the ones that U.S. potential adversaries might plausibly seek to attack, and thus need to be defended, including through their own efforts. By contrast, less powerful and less vulnerable states are not very significant in the burden sharing context; their increased efforts will not matter much and they are not plausible targets for serious attack. Accordingly, the United States should dedicate disproportionate effort to moving the needle among key states, the ones where a change of effort would really matter for U.S. interests.

In this vein, the following will focus on U.S. allies. By definition, the United States is not bound to come to the defense of U.S. partners, such as India, Vietnam, or various Latin American countries. They therefore are not the focus of U.S. defense planning nor relied upon to come to the defense of those in the U.S. alliance network. Furthermore, because such countries are unable to rely on U.S. security protection, they tend to pursue far more independent and self-reliant security and defense policies — “self-help.” As a consequence, U.S. leverage over them is more limited. On the flip side, though, these states tend to do more for their self-defense than many U.S. allies. They both demand less in the way of U.S. security commitment and resources and, at least those that perceive themselves as threatened, tend to do more on defense. Finland, for instance, has had a much more robust military capability than, say Norway or Denmark.

Meanwhile, U.S. partners that are not very threatened and lack significant power projection capacity, such as Brazil or Colombia, are highly unlikely to contribute much of anything to key U.S. security challenges in the priority theaters. Greater burden sharing pressure on them will therefore not yield much in the way of increased value for collective defense.
In light of this, we can identify the key states for the United States from a burden sharing perspective.

Using established metrics for state power, the most powerful states in the U.S. alliance network are, in rough order: Japan, Germany, the United Kingdom, France, South Korea, Italy, Canada, Poland, and Australia.51

The most vulnerable states in the U.S. alliance system, meanwhile, are in rough order: Taiwan, the Baltic states, Poland, South Korea, the Philippines, Japan, and Romania.

From this list, we can select those relevant states that are either 1) not “pulling their weight,” whether in terms of level of defense spending and/or level of effort/orientation toward key shared threats, or 2) even if they are already more active or spending a significant amount, could plausibly make greater contributions toward shared security challenges, whether through higher defense spending or greater action and leadership.52
Underspending allies: Japan, Germany, Taiwan, and Canada. Many other U.S. states underspend on defense but are too small or distant to make a material difference (e.g., Spain, Portugal, Belgium) or lack the economic base and/or sophistication to make a major difference (e.g., the Philippines).

Might plausibly make greater effort toward shared security challenges: United Kingdom and France. There are other states that might contribute to shared security challenges. Some of these states already spend a good amount and/or do a lot (e.g., Australia and South Korea) or are relatively small powers (e.g., New Zealand).

From a burden sharing point of view, then, the most important states for the United States to work on are those that are especially powerful or vulnerable and that are not pulling their weight. These are the states that should be the primary focus of U.S. burden sharing strategies. At the same time, if the United States can leverage greater or more strategically aligned effort from those that are willing to do more and can, that would also help.

In this light, the key “problem” countries are Japan, Germany, and Taiwan. Japan and Germany are very large and advanced economies but manifestly do not “pull their weight” either in terms of defense spending or actions on shared security challenges. Taiwan, meantime, is the most vulnerable part of the U.S. alliance system, but does not do enough for its own defense. Canada is a country that, while a mid-sized, has an advanced and robust economy – it is, after all, a G-7 member – and thus could do much more and have an impact on shared security challenges if it did so.

Countries that, while they already do a lot, could plausibly be expected to do more are France and the United Kingdom. These are major security actors that have a broader perspective and a higher set of national ambitions; they therefore might plausibly do more.
KEY COUNTRY ANALYSIS

In light of this, the study will focus on the following countries: Japan, Germany, Taiwan, Canada, France, and the United Kingdom.

JAPAN

- Threat perception: High
  - Severability: Low
  - U.S. military umbrella leverage: High
- Political/cultural factors:
  - Pacifist/territorial defense
  - Susceptibility to external pressure on “unpaid debt”
- Economic/interest group incentive to defense spending:
  - Constraints on overall spending but significant defense industry

Overview

In strategic terms, Japan is America’s single most important ally. Yet it dramatically underspends on defense relative not only to the United States but also relative to its security circumstances, with – by Tokyo’s own admission – increasingly severe threats posed by China and, to a lesser degree, North Korea. At the same time, Japan is the world’s third largest economy (in market exchange terms) and by a considerable margin the largest economy other than the United States itself in the U.S. alliance network. It is also directly exposed to the threat from China, lying just off the coast of mainland Asia along the first island chain in the Western Pacific. Its role in checking China’s domineering aspirations in Asia is uniquely critical. So Japan has the power, wealth, and location to make a significant difference in the fate of any anti-hegemonic coalition, and its threat perception – at least formally – is high.

Yet Japan’s level of effort on defense remains very low, even anemic. In 2021, Japan spent just 1.1% of its GDP on defense. By contrast, neighboring South Korea spent 2.28% and less immediately threatened Australia spent 2.2%. While the rhetoric from the Japanese government has become progressively more alarmed and Tokyo has shifted its defense efforts toward China and its western approaches, Japan’s level of defense spending has barely budged – this despite repeated requests from Japan’s Ministry of Defense for higher levels of investment. As of this writing, Japan was
making signals toward increasing defense spending, but in relatively vague terms and over a longer period of time.\textsuperscript{57}

For these reasons, it seems fair to say that Japan is America’s biggest and most consequential burden sharing problem. Indeed, it is not an exaggeration to say that whether Japan increases its level of defense spending and effort will play a critical role in whether the anti-hegemonic coalition against China will succeed or not. Without greater effort by Japan, in light of China’s ongoing increases, the coalition may well be doomed. It therefore must be a matter of urgent priority for the United States to induce Tokyo to increase its military efforts.

But how? If we apply the three lenses to the question of why Japan is lagging:

\textit{Realist Lens}

\textbf{Source of the Problem}: From a realist perspective, Japan’s lassitude is puzzling. Given the greatly and manifestly increased security threat from China, it is strange that Japan is not doing more for its defense. This is especially odd because the problem is not one of perception – Tokyo loudly trumpets the security threat from China. So why is Japan not doing more?

A realist lens would indicate that Japan is not necessarily acting irrationally, though. Rather, the realist lens would suggest that Japan is probably relying on U.S. security protection, seeking to continue its postwar free-riding success by inducing and encouraging the United States to increase its own defense efforts to address the growing threat from China. In a sense, Japan is seeking to burden-shift onto a United States that it plausibly believes will assume much of the additional burden.

Through this realist lens, then, the Japan burden sharing problem for the United States is one of \textit{over-assurance}: Japan believes that it is prudent and reasonable to keep its own defense effort low because it is sufficiently confident that the United States will make up the difference in addressing the security threat generated by China’s growing power.

\textit{Proposed Strategies}: If the source of the burden sharing problem is Japan’s confidence that the United States will pick up the slack, then the realist solution is to discomfit Tokyo. But, given Japan’s enormous importance to the United States and the coalition
as a whole, cutting Japan off would be highly ill-advised and thus not credible even as a burden sharing strategy.

Accordingly, and given that Japan is directly threatened by China as a “frontline” state, Japan appears to be a prime case for indirect security-reducing strategies. In particular, the realist lens would support Washington adjusting its military posture, plans, strategies, and the like to reduce the degree or extent of protection Japan would enjoy vis a vis China, even while Washington would stick with the alliance. To remind, the purpose of this would be to induce Tokyo to shift its level of effort on defense; the threat would thus be conditional and reversible. This strategy is likely feasible, given the breadth and extent of the damage China threatens to be able to do to Japan. China has a myriad of air, naval, and other strike capabilities that can hold Japan directly at risk, as well as jeopardize the seaborne trade on which Japan is so dependent. While there is likely no world in which Japan can be perfectly defended from a determined Chinese attack, how buffered Japan is from it will depend critically and centrally on the degree, nature, and intensity of the American military effort to defend Japan.

The United States can therefore credibly threaten to Japan that, unless it increases its defense spending and level of effort, the United States will not make such vigorous efforts to defend Japan fully, but will rather take a more defense-in-depth approach while remaining committed to the alliance. As one initial example, the United States could pull back its commitment to defend the Senkaku Islands as simply untenable given the lack of Japanese effort.

Just how to pull off this strategy is, though, a critical question. Needless to say, such an approach would generate significant turbulence and friction in the alliance. This may be inevitable and well worth more significant Japanese effort, but it also would need to be monitored and where possible mitigated, lest it hobble or even fracture this critical alliance. To avoid this, the United States might start out pursuing this approach quietly, without major fanfare, while communicating the “direction of travel” to the government in Tokyo. This would allow the government in Tokyo to see what was coming and, ideally, quickly and resolutely adapt. This angle would permit a more graduated approach to the issue rather than outright causing a public contretemps. In any case, the point would be to credibly convey that the United States would move in this direction absent greater Japanese effort, but in ways that would, at least initially, minimize unnecessary “static” and irreversible moves. If that failed, the United States could always escalate to more dramatic steps if advisable.
**Political/Ideological Lens**

*Source of the Problem:* Viewed through a political-ideological lens, Japan’s lassitude is far less puzzling. Japan, after all, is the paradigmatic quasi-pacifist state. While the reality of Japan’s behavior and official perspectives are far more complex, Japan’s dominant internal political and intellectual narrative since the end of the Second World War has been, if not pacifism, then at least the abjuration of any use of the military for anything other than the strictest self-defense. Unlike West Germany, which during the early Cold War was deliberately remilitarized in NATO as part of collective defense of the Alliance, Japan embraced its American-imposed “peace constitution”; until recently it did not formally have a military but rather a “self-defense force.”

As a result, while Japan’s government has historically been more “realistic” in security/strategic terms, the broader national political culture is strongly influenced and constrained by anti-military, anti-intervention, and pacifistic elements. At least in part as a result, Japan has a number of strong internal norms such as its longstanding interpretation of the Constitution to prohibit the involvement of Japanese armed forces in foreign wars, its “Three No’s” on nuclear weapons and its longstanding commitment to a low defense budget of roughly 1 percent of GDP.

In addition, Japan has a strong national self-image as a constructive and significant player in the international arena. Its self-image and the image it projects abroad have largely, however, focused on its commercial success, trade, development, and the like. It has not self-identified or projected a strong identification as a security provider or contributor to collective defense, as – by contrast – the United Kingdom and Australia have.

At the same time, Japan is a famously duty and honor-oriented society. While conceptions of what those obligations entail have substantially evolved over the last century and a half of Japanese history, they remain a commonly-remarked upon fundamental facet of Japanese social and political life.

*Proposed Strategies:* If the source of Japan’s burden sharing reluctance is a quasi-pacifism and an international and self-image that understands Japan’s obligations to be non-defense related, then the solution for the United States is to try to encourage the shift of these conceptions to ones more favorable to collective defense. The best
strategies would likely focus on emphasizing to Japanese audiences and those international audiences that influence Japanese decisionmaking two particular themes: that greater efforts on collective defense are *legitimate* and that Japan has a *duty* to undertake them. In doing so, the United States can try to supplant the narratives traditionally dominant in Japan with a positive alternative – an argument for the *moral legitimacy* of collective defense over pacifism and a call to Japan’s *duty* to meet its shared obligations.

This approach would counsel that the United States clearly reject and oppose Japan’s presentation of quasi-pacifism and a focus on non-military contributions in its policy or self-image. The United States can, of course, seek to shape the Japanese national conversation through numerous avenues. But particular lines of argument would include, first off, pointing out the immorality and unjustifiability of pacifism in the face of a serious security threat, and the superiority on both moral and strategic grounds of collective defense. The United States can also point out that postwar Japan has not, in truth, been a pacifist country – it has had a robust military defense since the Second World War, largely provided by the U.S. military but also in reality a powerful Japanese military. Together, these arguments can help discredit the pacifist strain in Japanese political-intellectual life, while strengthening the preferred alternative of collective defense.

This approach would also emphasize the central moral and political importance of Japan meetings its *duty* to contribute to shared and collective defense. This would have both a positive component – that Japan should live up to its expected contributions – but also a shaming element – that Japan is failing to live up to its duty to do its part for shared security. This would apply not only directly to Japan’s own case but, by stretching American resources and will, undermines the security of other countries, not only neighbors like South Korea and Taiwan, but also European states. In this context, Japan would have a choice between commendably living up to its responsibilities or selfishly shirking them. Given the powerful strains of shame culture and collective thinking in Japanese culture, it seems likely that – properly framed and given a positive face by prominent political figures, such as the late Shinzo Abe – this argument could be potent. Indeed, Japan’s shift after the Persian Gulf War seems an example of the success of such a duty argument.  

In light of this, the United States would insist upon not only the strategic necessity of greater Japanese effort, but also its morality. Rather than accepting Japanese assertions,
for instance, that Japan’s contributions are made in the non-military sphere, Washington would reject such arguments. Instead, Washington would press Japan to do its part, both because such action would be legitimate and because it is Japan’s duty to fulfill its obligations. Such a line could be tailored to – even if delicately and implicitly – trigger Japan’s famous concern for shame and face. While the United States would want to be cautious about openly lodging such accusations, in Japan’s more indirect and formal culture, even strong intimations that Japan was acting in ways that should trigger embarrassment could make a material difference.

Strategies of sympathy, glory, and the power of example appear unlikely to be as productive in Japan. Japan is one of the most internally-oriented countries in the world, with a very strong sense of national identity. Strategies that rely on sympathy for out-groups or drawing Japan toward America due to its affinity therefore seem unlikely to bear as much fruit. Japan disavowed the pursuit of national grandeur after World War II, and it remains in bad odor in Japanese society; strategies emphasizing this approach seem unlikely to work very well, either.

*Economic/Interest Group Lens*

*Source of the Problem:* Viewed through an economic/interest group lens, Japan’s lassitude is rational given its longstanding tradition and global orientation as an export-driven economic power. Japan’s dominant sub-groups have potent incentives to maintain a relatively weak currency and, more importantly for this study, to cut or cap government costs wherever possible.

Since the Dodge Plan’s “reverse course” unwound failed American-style market reforms in the 1950s and re-empowered the traditional pre-war zaibatsu (corporate) and keiretsu (conglomerate) coalitions within the Japanese National Diet, the dominant political culture – exemplified by the decades-long dominance of the conservative Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) – has favored capital and exporters over the interests of labor and consumers. Minimal defense spending, no doubt reinforced by the aforementioned culture of pacifism, is through the prism of sub-group interests rightly understood as cognate with Japan’s minimalist welfare state – seen as a further drag on Japan’s protracted struggle with low GDP growth, or at least held in tension with palatable efforts at higher growth rates.
While it could be argued that boosting defense spending might aid in GDP growth, two connected issues remain obstacles. First, dominant business sub-groups are not necessarily interested – or do not have a primary interest in – promoting topline GDP growth at any cost. For example, for Japanese automobile manufacturers, greater growth in the defense sector could redound to a stronger currency that would cut into export margins, or might be achieved only via corporate tax increases. Second and relatedly, funding greater defense expenditures via deficit spending is unpalatable to key subgroups. Japan has one of the highest debt-to-GDP ratios of any developed nation, a fact that a number of recent governing parties have tried to address with little success. In combination, from a sub-group perspective, these two facts suggest little to no appetite within the Japanese sub-group system for greater defense spending.

**Proposed Strategies:** As a consequence, given Japan’s primacy in the U.S. alliance system, negative or punitive approaches should likely be avoided, given that they risk damaging such an important relationship, both diplomatically and economically. In light of that, focus should center on positive approaches, especially direct positive approaches. Finding ways to effectively expand Japan’s defense budget in real terms should be the primary line of effort. The deduction from this is that finding ways to support or subsidize Japanese defense companies should be America’s initial focus.63

This approach would bypass key Japanese sub-groups’ near-insurmountable disincentives to finance greater defense spending via corporate tax increases or unpalatable debt expansion. Effectively subsidizing their defense companies will, in real terms, expand Japan’s defense budgets. Additionally, undertaking a study of how Japan’s defense exports might be integrated with the procurement efforts of regional allies and partners without much potential for developing their own defense corporations should become a U.S.-led priority.
GERMANY

- Threat perception: Medium
  - Severability: Low
  - U.S. military umbrella leverage: Medium
- Political/cultural factors:
  - Anti-military strain
  - Leadership role in Europe
- Economic/interest group incentive to defense spending:
  - Defense industry in need of capital

Overview

Germany is one of America’s most important allies. It is the largest economy in Europe and the second largest economy in the American alliance system. During the Cold War, West Germany was a major bulwark of NATO defense. Yet since the Cold War Germany has nearly dismantled its defense forces. Its spending on defense has been low even by NATO standards, and what it does spend has led to little military efficacy. Indeed, Germany’s armed forces are in notoriously poor shape.64

This is an especially acute problem for the United States because Germany is critical to NATO security, especially if the United States is actually to pivot to focus on the military threat posed by China in Asia. As made clear across two administrations and by multiple senior military officers and analysts, the United States does not have a military large or capable enough to fight two wars on even roughly concurrent timelines.65 This means that European NATO must assume a greater degree of responsibility for its security, or a security vulnerability in Europe could very well result, especially if and as Russia recovers from its war in Ukraine.

Germany’s role in this respect is critically important. Not only is it the largest economy in Europe, but it is also centrally located, adjacent or proximate to all of the key players on the continent, including the most threatened NATO states in Northeastern Europe. Germany also plays a leading role in the European Union and other European bodies, and thus is a natural leader in Europe in terms of coordinating Allied defenses.

But until recently Germany was, despite repeated prodding from the United States under the Obama and particularly the Trump Administrations, largely recalcitrant on
raising its level of defense effort. Indeed, Germany actually moved in the opposite
direction in the early 2010s and only made modest, grudging increases in defense
spending between 2014 and 2022 despite intense pressure from Washington and
Berlin’s own commitment to reach 2% of GDP spent on defense as part of the Wales
Summit.

In the wake of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, however, Berlin suddenly shifted course,
announcing a major increase in defense spending, among other initiatives. Often called
a “Zeitenwende,” this appeared to augur a major shift in Berlin’s policy on burden
sharing and collective defense. The time since February 2022, however, has raised
significant questions about whether Germany will sustain its pledges. It appears,
therefore, that Germany will continue to be a challenge from a burden sharing point of
view.

Applying the three lenses to Germany’s behavior yields the following:

**Realist Lens**

*Source of the Problem:* From a realist perspective, Germany’s behavior is not
particularly surprising. During the Cold War, West Germany sat on the front line, so it
was directly threatened. Moreover, given its strength, its contributions made a material
difference not only in the ability of the Alliance to defend against a Soviet Bloc attack,
but also in whether the Allies would agree to a forward defense, which was of vital
importance to the Federal Republic. Hence West Germany’s relatively high
contributions to NATO defense during the Cold War were, viewed through a realist lens,
unsurprising.

With the collapse of the Soviet Union, though, now unified Germany found itself with no
serious, even remotely direct military threat. At the same time, the United States was
manifestly prepared to maintain and even expand its role as security hegemon in
Europe. There was thus little threat to Germany, and Germany’s efforts were not
particularly material in dealing with them. It was thus prudent for Germany to disarm.

Moreover, from a realist perspective, it was advantageous. Unified Germany’s historical
quandary had been that, though the strongest power in Europe, it was not strong
enough to overmaster all its neighbors, and it thus felt threatened from multiple
directions, even as its neighbors felt threatened by it. During the Second and Third
Reichs, Berlin built up and aggressively employed its military to take on its multiple rivals — but this twice led to disastrous defeat. Post-Cold War Germany took a fundamentally different route, based on the pacifying and stabilizing force of the American security umbrella, which provided assurance to Berlin’s neighbors that it could not attack them. This apparent constraining — the “keeping Germany down” part of the famous Ismay saying — actually gave Berlin a new route to achieve its goals.

Germany could achieve many of its longstanding goals — including economic primacy on the Continent — without using its military or indeed without any fielding any meaningful military capability whatsoever. Germany could avoid the security dilemmas that had helped propel the world wars and save money, all while achieving a dominant place in Europe’s economic orbit. From this realist vantage, Germany’s de-militarization made thoroughgoing sense, and helps to explain its strong resistance to changing course. If this policy had been so successful, why change it?66

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine caused Berlin to reassess this calculus, however, and to commit to substantially increased defense spending and changes in other policies that had constrained Berlin’s ability to contribute to shared security challenges. That said, there are questions about how significant and lasting these changes will be. To the extent they have happened, though, there are strong indications that it has been a realist calculus that has driven Germany’s changes to policy and spending levels, suggesting that the realist lens is very significant in Berlin’s decisionmaking calculus. Most prominently, Chancellor Olaf Scholz’ speech to the Bundestag in February 2022 announcing the increase in spending specifically pointed to the greater threat perception as the reason for Germany’s increased defense spending.67

Viewed through a realist lens, then, the most significant driver of Germany’s follow-through on its pledges to spend and do more will be the perceived threat from Russia. If the threat from Russia is seen to attenuate, the less Germany is likely to do. Indeed, there are already significant signals of German backsliding on meeting its commitments.68 Conversely, if the threat from Russia is seen to be sustained or increase, then Germany is likely to do more. Relatedly, if the American defense umbrella is seen to be thinning in ways that make the threat from Russia more pointed, that could also be material in Berlin’s calculus.

*Proposed Strategies:* From a realist point of view, then, Germany’s unwillingness to bear its share of the collective defense burden is a difficult problem to solve. Cutting off
Germany as an ally does not make strategic sense, given the country’s importance and size. Doing so would leave a gaping hole in the middle of NATO. Therefore the threat to do it is likely to be incredible in any case. But more indirect risk exposure strategies will also be difficult to employ on Germany. Russia’s ability to threaten Germany (at least with conventional forces) is real but limited; U.S. actions are unlikely to result in significantly greater Germany defense exposure. Indeed, the withdrawal of significant U.S. forces from Germany – while likely necessary on strictly military optimization grounds – will not really increase Germany’s overall vulnerability, given that Poland stands between it and Russia. Indeed, such a withdrawal might actually make Germany less of a target for Russia by reducing the number of U.S. military forces operating from the country.

In light of this, the most effective realist-grounded policy Washington can pursue is likely to relate to Europe as a whole, rather than just Germany. Since Germany is so difficult to narrowly tailor a strategy toward, the best option for the United States is likely to emphasize the limited and declining ability of the United States to defend Europe as a whole. This is credible: the United States currently lacks and for the foreseeable future will lack the military capabilities to fight China and Russia on even roughly concurrent timeframes. There is real scarcity in key areas like precision munitions, logistics, long-range bombers, attack submarines, space, and the like. As a matter of necessity, this means the United States will have to prioritize between these two regions – whether avowedly or not. And two National Defense Strategies in succession have directed that China and Asia will be the priority. As a logical consequence, then, the United States will prioritize Asia.

This will by necessity leave some degree of vulnerability in Europe. Part of this will be determined by U.S. force developments and Russia’s recovery from the war in Ukraine. But much of that degree of vulnerability will be driven by how much and how effectively Europeans step up to plug the gaps in Allied security in Europe. The state with by far the greatest ability to plug this gap is Germany, given its economic primacy and lack of defense spending up to this point. Germany should naturally, then, be a focal point for attention if and as this vulnerability increases.

U.S. policy, then, can stress strongly to Germany this reality, making clear not only that there will be gaps in Allied security but also that Germany’s role, as Europe’s largest economy, is vital and will be emphasized. While this approach will be more indirect than
would be optimal for a realist-based case for burden sharing, it is likely the best available strategy for dealing with Berlin.

**Political/Ideological Lens**

*Source of the Problem:* Germany’s unwillingness to contribute to burden sharing is also unsurprising when viewed through a political-ideological lens. While West Germany rearmed as part of the NATO defense against the Soviet Bloc, the legacy of the World Wars cast a dark shadow over postwar Germany. Even though the Cold War Bundeswehr was a highly formidable force, it was tightly tied to homeland defense and subordinated to Allied (read: especially U.S.) command in the vein of the famous Ismay line that NATO’s purpose was to keep the Americans in, the Russians out, and the Germans down. Meantime, after the 1968 movements and especially with the Euromissile crisis, German political and intellectual life took a more anti-military and pacifist turn. While these sentiments were especially strong on Germany’s left, including its Green Party now in government, they have been influential across the political spectrum.

This hardened as an ascendancy after the collapse of the Soviet Union removed the direct military threat to Germany. The rapid and peaceful collapse of the Soviet empire strengthened the tendencies in German political and intellectual life that discounted the role of military force while stressing the role of dialogue, engagement, and even the end of history. With the removal of the threat to Germany’s security, there was little serious countercurrent in the German political and intellectual arena.

That said, German political-intellectual life is not, of course, monochromatically pacifist. Rather, it includes strong currents that are more susceptible to outside – including U.S. – influence toward better burden sharing outcomes. These include a legacy sense of commitment and gratitude to the NATO alliance and the European project, as well as a broader sense of Germany’s postwar national purpose being to advance the security and stability of the region rather than, as in the pre-1945 era, exploit and dominate it. It also includes a classically German sense of obligation and moral duty, of paying one’s debts. Overall, German political culture, especially on issues of international affairs, is heavily inflected with a moral or even moralistic overtone.

*Proposed Strategies:* In light of these factors, the United States could profitably highlight three political-ideological strategies toward Germany: duty, legitimacy, and
sympathy. Glory and the power of example are unlikely to pay high dividends with Germany.

A focus on duty would involve emphasizing Germany’s obligation to do more for collective defense. This emphasis on obligation could include both a general duty to contribute to Europe’s collective defense, from which the Federal Republic has benefited so much, as well as a narrower focus on the importance of Germany paying its fair share financially.

The first line would emphasize that contemporary Germany has a deep obligation to contribute to the security of Europe. This would be consistent not just with Germany’s size and wealth, but with its self-image as a responsible and moral state, one that is a critical contributor to collective goods. This theme of Germany conceiving of itself as a contributor to European well-being is deeply embedded in German political life across the political spectrum.73

Moreover, it is a particular responsibility because the Federal Republic has benefited more from collective defense than any other state – despite Germany’s legacy. NATO defended West Germany during the Cold War, when the FRG was the frontline with the Soviet Bloc. NATO and confidence in collective defense were critical ingredients for the unification of Germany at the end of the Cold War. And NATO’s expansion has created a more secure strategic environment for Germany than it has ever experienced. At no time in its history have Germany’s security concerns been so distant.

Accordingly, because it is such an enormous beneficiary of NATO collective defense – probably the primary gainer – Germany naturally has a clear obligation to contribute, at least to its pledged level of 2% of GDP. Even more, the countries that now most need Germany’s security contributions are the Eastern European states, precisely those that suffered most during the Second World War at Germany’s hands. This only increases the moral obligation on Germany to do its part.

The narrower duty argument would focus on Germany’s simple obligation as a NATO member and a party to the Wales pledge to spend 2% of its GDP on defense. Germany has come nowhere close to meeting that standard since making it. This obligation argument would focus on Germany’s simple duty to pay its fair share. While this should have wide currency, Germany may be especially susceptible to at least some variants of this argument, given the stereotypically strong German focus on economy, paying debts,
and probity. Indeed, it could be argued that President Trump’s focus on this line of argument was one of the reasons for Germany increasing its defense spending at all.\textsuperscript{74}

Both of these duty arguments could be made directly to Germans, but also to its neighbors and other NATO allies whose judgment is important to Berlin. The more the latter came to these conclusions, the more pressure they would be likely to bring to bear on Berlin.

A second political-ideological strategy would focus on the legitimacy of greater German contributions to shared security challenges. If one of the main inhibitors to greater German effort is a perception among Germans and some of its neighbors that more significant German military effort is illegitimate, then altering those perceptions will be critical to enabling such greater effort. Accordingly, the United States can argue to both Germans and their neighbors that greater German effort would be legitimate for various reasons.

Perhaps the most important is that greater German effort would be nested within a clear collective security framework – NATO. Unlike the unilateral and domineering German militarism of the early 20\textsuperscript{th} Century, greater German effort today would be toward and within a collective framework. Germany would not be fielding untethered military forces; rather, it would be contributing these new capabilities specifically to NATO goals and requirements. This changes the moral character of any German military build-up.

A separate line of argument for the legitimacy of German effort would be the changed nature of Germany and its government. Contemporary Germany is, of course, not its Nazi or Wilhelmine predecessors. It is an established and stable democracy. Greater defense effort by such a state, then, is a far different matter from that of the Third or Second Reichs. This point could equally be made to both Germans and their neighbors.

A third political-ideological strategy is to seek to catalyze German sympathy for its European neighbors. This strategy would “pull on the heartstrings” of the German population, seeking to induce greater effort by appealing to the “better angels” of their natures. Especially in light of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the suffering it has caused, this strategy might be more effective. This strategy seeks to prompt action by appealing to the pity and altruism of Germans. It is distinguished from the duty approach, which has an obligatory element. This strategy is more fundamentally affective. This strategy may have a considerable effect because there a strong current of
humanitarianism and international altruism in German politics and intellectual life. Whatever the reality of how much Germany has done, many Germans appear to want to help those suffering. This strategy would appeal to that desire.

Economic/Interest Group Lens

Source of the Problem: In many ways, through the prism of key sub-groups, the reasons for German lassitude are similar to Japan’s. Given its own longstanding tradition and global orientation as an export-driven economic power, Germany’s dominant sub-groups have potent incentives to maintain, in relative terms, a weak currency and, more importantly for this study, to cut or cap government costs wherever possible.

Since the Marshall Plan, administered through the Economic Cooperation Administration (ECA), re-empowered manufacturing coalitions within the Bundestag, the dominant German political culture has favored exporters over the interests of labor and both German and EU consumers. Minimal defense spending, no doubt reinforced by a historically-conditioned culture of pacifism, is seen through the prism of sub-group interests rightly understood as cognate with Germany’s focus on minimizing labor’s economic and, therefore, political power – most recently exemplified the Hartz reforms in the early 2000s.

Just as with Japan, while it could be argued that boosting defense spending might aid in German GDP growth, two intertwined challenges pose serious obstacles. First, dominant business sub-groups are not necessarily interested – or do not have a primary interest in – promoting topline GDP growth at any cost. For example, for German automobile manufacturers, greater defense sector growth could redound to a stronger currency that would cut into export margins, or might be achieved only via corporate tax increases.

However, secondly, funding greater defense expenditures via deficit spending is unpalatable to key centrist subgroups. German debt is relatively low for developed countries, but it has a “debt brake” that was written into its constitution in 2009 in the wake of the financial crisis. While centrist governing parties have stuck by it, the Green Party has become critical of this mechanism as it prevents greater expenditure on green energy projects. Even if the mechanism were lifted, however, aligning strict ESG-guided European banks with greater defense spending may prove an uphill battle.
Proposed Strategies: As with Japan, given Germany’s centrality to U.S. force re-posturing in Europe, **negative or punitive** approaches should be avoided, given that they risk damaging such an important relationship both diplomatically and economically. In light of that, focus should likely center on **positive** approaches, especially **direct positive** approaches. Finding ways to effectively expand Germany’s defense budget in real terms should be the primary line of effort. The deduction from this is that finding ways to support or subsidize German defense corporations should be America’s initial focus, an approach that these sub-groups might especially appreciative given the strict regulatory regime around the EU- and German-based financial system.

This approach would bypass key German sub-groups’ disincentives to finance greater defense spending via corporate tax increases or politically disfavored debt expansion. Effectively subsidizing their defense companies will, in real terms, expand the German defense budget – a fact that will grant centrist German politicians additional political cover to hold to Olaf Scholz’s promising “Zeitenwende” policy. Additionally, undertaking a study of how Germany’s re-empowered defense exports might be integrated with the procurement efforts of regional allies and partners without much potential for developing their own defense corporations should become a U.S.-led priority.
Taiwan

- Threat perception: High
  - Severability: Medium-high
  - U.S. military umbrella leverage: High
- Political/cultural factors:
  - Anti-military strain
  - Strains of pro-China sentiment
- Economic/interest group incentive to defense spending:
  - Nascent defense industry in need of capital

Overview

Taiwan, while not a formal U.S. treaty ally, is effectively part of the U.S. defense perimeter and thus, for strategic planning purposes, equivalent to an ally. In that light and in the face of China’s enormous military buildup primarily focused on it, Taiwan is the most vulnerable part of the U.S. defense perimeter. Given its relatively small size and proximity to the mainland, it is highly exposed to Chinese military action, and the threat from the PRC is growing. Yet Taiwan spends a relatively modest amount of its national wealth on defense, and much of what it spends goes toward “shiny objects” widely considered ill-suited for a serious defense of the island from PRC attack. Indeed, the discordance between Taiwan’s dire situation and its relative lassitude on defense has been one of the most prominent elements of the burden sharing discussion in recent years.76

Whether Taiwan actually increases and appropriately focuses its defense efforts are of great significance to the United States. While other U.S. allies like Japan and Germany are more powerful, Taiwan’s fate is of great importance to the fate of the U.S. alliance network in Asia, and thus to the whole effort to prevent China from dominating the region. While not an existential interest, Taiwan’s fall would deal a serious blow to any anti-hegemonic coalition against China. At the same time, Taiwan is China’s best target and thus its most likely; Taiwan is the most vulnerable to Chinese attack among countries within the U.S. defense perimeter. Taiwan is therefore China’s best target and thus its most likely.

Moreover, Taiwan’s own efforts to augment its own defenses matter a great deal. How much and how well Taiwan invests in defense will be of signal importance to how
difficult and costly it would be to defend Taiwan from China by the United States – and indeed whether it is defensible at all. If Taiwan spends more and spends it wisely, it will be easier and less costly for America to help defend it – and the reverse also holds. Indeed, whether Taiwan is defensible at all is in large part a matter of how much and how wisely Taiwan spends and does for its self-defense. As a result of these factors, Taiwan’s defense efforts are among the most – if not the most – important burden sharing issue for the United States.

Yet, despite the acute danger it faces, Taiwan’s level of effort on defense remains very low, even anemic. In 2021, Taiwan spent just 1.7% of its GDP on defense even as China increased its spending to more than 22 times what Taiwan spent. In 2022, that number only increased marginally: to 2.3% of GDP. Even worse, most assessments indicate that Taiwan continues to spend what it does allocate to defense suboptimally, on “shiny objects” better suited for symbolism rather than the “asymmetric” capabilities optimal for self-defense against invasion and blockade.

For these reasons, it seems fair to say that Taiwan is America’s most acute burden sharing problem. Indeed, whether and how much Taiwan increases and focuses its defense efforts is likely to be a key driver of whether a war with China over the island happens and, if it does, how the United States and its allies would fare in it. It therefore must be a matter of urgent priority for the United States to induce Taiwan to increase its military efforts and focus them more optimally on its own self-defense.

But how? Applying the three lenses to the question of why Taiwan is lagging:

**Realist Lens**

**Source of the Problem:** From a realist perspective, Taiwan’s relative inaction is highly puzzling – in some ways, it is genuinely staggering. Taiwan is acutely threatened; it is one of the countries in the world most directly and severely threatened by a great power. Yet its defense spending has remained anemic even as China’s has grown by leaps and bounds, and with the PLA’s top focus being the ability to attack and subordinate Taiwan itself.

Taiwan’s lassitude is even more puzzling because, unlike full-fledged U.S. allies, Taiwan does not enjoy a clearly unequivocal U.S. commitment to its defense. For the decades following the switch of recognition from Taipei to Beijing, Washington adhered to a
policy of “strategic ambiguity,” remaining studiedly vague about whether it would come to Taiwan’s defense in the event of a Chinese attack. And though Washington has increasingly moved toward a declaratory policy committing itself to the defense of Taiwan, Washington has at least formally stood by the traditional policy of “strategic ambiguity” — even after several statements by President Biden that the United States would defend the island.  

This ambiguity would seem to indicate that Taiwan should not be confident it could rely on U.S. defense — and thus it could not seriously expect to free ride. If free riding is refusing to pay one’s fair share because one knows the security will be provided, then that approach cannot really follow if one is not confident one will be defended. Yet Taiwan’s relative passivity remains.

According to conventional realist theory, a threatened state that wants to maintain its autonomy — as Taiwan’s political leadership and polling suggest it does — should arm up to defend itself, and indeed be willing to spend a great deal to do so. Small Israel and Finland, for instance, have built up powerful defensive militaries to protect themselves, and have strong national traditions of military service to underwrite that goal. Even Switzerland has a strong national defense tradition.

Nor does Taiwan lack a national military tradition — the Republic of China has a strong military tradition going back to the early 20th century, including the war against Japan and the civil war against the Communists, among others. Chiang Kai-Shek was, after all, known as Generalissimo.

So what is going on? Probably the strongest explanation through the realist prism remains, despite its imperfect fit, the free-riding one. A realist explanation assumes Taiwan seeks to protect its security, and the threat from China is very clear. So the realist prism must judge that Taiwan assumes its security will come from somewhere.

The most natural explanation through the realist prism is that Taiwan assumes the United States, while not clearly and unequivocally committed, is sufficiently likely to come to Taiwan’s aid such that Taiwan can afford to underspend on defense and spend what it does allocate inefficiently. Alternatively, though, Taiwan, especially key Taiwanese military and security leaders, may simply not adequately appreciate the threat, despite its mounting evidence.
Proposed Strategies: If, as with Japan, the source of the burden sharing problem is Taiwan’s confidence that the United States will protect it sufficiently to justify continuing its defense lassitude, then the solution is to discomfit Taiwan and to reduce any lingering misunderstanding or uncertainty about the scale of the threat China poses to the island. To the latter, the United States can actively share information and assessments likely to reduce such misconceptions. To the second, but unlike with Japan, the United States can pursue the full-range of realist burden sharing pressure strategies. This is for two reasons: First, Taiwan, while very important to the U.S. anti-hegemonic coalition, it is not truly an existential interest for the United States and, second, the costs of defending Taiwan if it remains lax will be very high – and possibly prohibitive – for the United States and its allies.

Keeping Taiwan in the U.S. perimeter would be the ideal outcome. Taiwan’s loss would be a major blow to the anti-hegemonic coalition and likely significantly impair U.S. efforts to balance against China. The United States may still be able to do so, however, even if Taiwan is lost. Therefore, while the United States should seek to prevent Beijing from invading and seizing Taiwan, it can and must also prepare for a world in which Taiwan is lost. Meanwhile, time is short and the situation is very urgent. This set of factors suggests pursuing the full range of realist strategies vis a vis Taiwan and pursuing them aggressively.

At a minimum, the realist lens would counsel that the United States should adjust its military posture, plans, strategies, and the like to reduce the degree or extent of protection Taiwan would enjoy in the event of conflict, even while sticking with the (quasi-)alliance. This strategy is highly feasible, given the breadth and extent of the damage China can wreak on Taiwan. China has a myriad of air, naval, and other strike capabilities that can hold Taiwan directly at risk, as well as jeopardize the air- and seaborne trade on which Taiwan is so dependent. While there is no plausible world in which Taiwan can be perfectly defended from a determined Chinese attack, how buffered Taiwan is from Chinese attacks and blockade will depend critically and centrally on the degree, nature, and intensity of the American military effort.

The United States can therefore credibly make clear to Taiwan that, unless it increases its defense spending and focuses its military efforts far more rigorously on defense against Chinese invasion and blockade, the United States will not make such vigorous efforts to offer a more comprehensive defense of Taiwan. Instead, the United States would rather take a more defense-in-depth approach – for instance, emphasizing a
protracted struggle following a Chinese lodgment on the island as opposed to denying such a lodgment in the first place – while remaining committed to the island’s defense. Given how urgent the situation is, thought, the United States likely best off pursuing an even more aggressive strategy. In this vein, the United States could clearly and urgently emphasize that the United States will in fact cut Taiwan off – severing it from its defense perimeter – if Taiwan does not spend more for its own defense and spend what it does allocate more efficiently. At the most basic level, this is because Taiwan is very important but not necessarily existential for the anti-hegemonic coalition, and Taiwan’s efforts to augment its own defenses are essential to ensuring that a U.S. defense of the island is feasible at a reasonable level of cost and risk for the United States. In other words, a Taiwan that spends a lot and spends it wisely will be one the United States can prudently protect. Conversely, a Taiwan that continues to be lax will cause the fight to be too costly and risky for the United States to prudently defend.

At root this is because, while losing Taiwan would be a major blow to the anti-hegemonic coalition in Asia, there is reason to believe it would likely survive Taiwan’s loss. Taiwan’s economy is significant but not very large by Asian standards; it is not Japan or India. At the same time, it is close to the Chinese mainland with much closer political intrication to the PRC; its loss thus could, even with difficulty, be differentiated from a credibility point of view, not just on the basis of its political and geographic proximity to the mainland but also by its willingness – or lack thereof – to defend itself. Asian states that are not so linked to China and are willing to defend themselves could reasonably differentiate their relationships with the United States – and the credibility United States’ commitments to them – from that of Taiwan and the United States.

To reiterate, this would be a major blow to the United States and the anti-hegemonic coalition – they would be far better off if Taiwan could be kept onside. But that is only true up to a point: if it does not cost beyond what it is worth. If Taiwan fails to do its part, the costs and risks of defending it are likely at some point to exceed the benefits.

An historical analogy is Churchill in the Battle of France, who wanted to send critical aircraft to reinforce the losing fight but concluded he had to save them for another day rather than see them lost. Those aircraft later proved critical in the defense of the United Kingdom in the Battle of Britain.83

Such an aggressive negotiating strategy would of course cause friction, and perhaps serious turbulence. Indeed, it is possible that Taiwan could react by ignoring American
pressure, or even at the extreme deciding to accede to Beijing’s wishes rather than make the political painful choice to increase defense efforts.

But the rationale for pursuing such an aggressive strategy is that it is both necessary and thus, at the end of the day, not a bluff. To make an American defense of Taiwan a sensible course of action, Taiwan must do its part – not simply as a matter of fairness, but as a matter of military reality if a U.S. effort is to be held at a tolerable level of cost and risk. If Taiwan fails to do this and the costs and risks of American intervention become simply too high to be sensible, the United States will have to cut Taiwan off. The logic of this negotiating strategy is that it is better for both the United States and Taiwan for Washington make this clear, not obscure it. The spirit of this strategy is to bring the needed sense of urgency as far forward as possible, precisely to avoid the threatened outcome.

Moreover, such a negotiating strategy should be more credible for precisely this reason. Because it makes sense and logically follows, it will be less likely to be seen as a bluff.

How to convey such a threat would, naturally, be a matter of practical, prudential judgment. The threat might not need to be directly conveyed, although it likely would need to be made clear to be credible. Washington could start by keeping the threat private and held to discreet government channels. If Taipei continued to be recalcitrant, the United States could broaden the message to a larger Taiwanese audience. The logic of the latter would be to bring adequate political pressure in order to generate the needed changes.

**Political/Ideological Lens**

*Source of the Problem:* From a political-ideological lens, Taiwan’s lassitude on its self-defense is also puzzling. Taiwan does not lack for political, intellectual, and ideological sources of effort for its self-defense against China.

On one part of the Taiwanese political spectrum, the legacy stems from the Kuomintang – the anti-Communist political party that fought the Civil War against Mao and continued the struggle for decades from exile in Taiwan. This should suggest that this part of the spectrum in Taiwan would favor standing up to the People’s Republic and the Chinese Communist Party, and would be comfortable in allocating effort to a strong defense in that direction. Meanwhile, on the other part of the political spectrum
Taiwan, there is a strong commitment in the Democrat Progressive Party to, even if not always independence, at least clear autonomy from the Mainland. This too would suggest stronger support for an anti-Communist or anti-Mainland posture.

Upon closer inspection, however, the situation appears less surprising. While the Kuomintang was anti-Communist, it was also a Chinese Nationalist party. Chiang Kai-Shek fervently clung to the notion that he and his government were the legitimate government of China, after all, not of Taiwan. Those with Chinese nationalist leanings on Taiwan may observe China’s meteoric rise to power and the marked decline in the genuinely Marxist-Leninist ideological element on the Mainland, even with Xi Jinping’s partial revival, and judge it to be acceptable – even desirable – for Taiwan to unify with the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation. Perhaps unsurprisingly, then, KMT-aligned politicians and policymakers have tended to underestimate the Chinese military threat. This has had a significant impact on Taiwan’s readiness in part because many of Taiwan’s senior military leaders fall in this camp.

The anti-Mainland element on Taiwan, meantime, most prominently represented by the Democratic Progressive Party, offers a different reason for a lack of attention to Taiwan’s military preparedness. The DPP was historically an anti-establishment, anti-government party, opposed to the Nationalist dictatorship of the Chiang Kai-Shek and Chiang Ching-Kuo years and the elites created and sustained by that administration. As a dissident/outsider party, the DPP has a strong anti-military strain, especially given the traditional conflation of the KMT and the ROC military. The effect of this may have historically made the DPP generally speaking less interested in and on the whole less equipped to push for a more vigorous and effective defense posture against the PRC.

**Proposed Strategies:** It is not entirely clear what can be done in the political-ideological frame to push Taiwan toward greater action for its own defense, especially in the timeframe relevant to material action by Taiwan. The United States could, of course, encourage a sense of obligation among Taiwanese to defend their own homeland, but it is unclear how American efforts would move the needle on that front. Further, Washington could encourage the sense that self-defense is legitimate among Taiwanese – but, again, it is unclear how the United States could materially shift views on Taiwan on this issue of fundamental, elemental survival.

Perhaps the most significant way Washington could promote a stronger support for defense among Taiwanese would be to promote a kind of glory – that Taiwan stands as
the vanguard of freedom and that its efforts to defend itself are watched and admired by free people around the world, in the vein of what is happening in Ukraine. The United States could make a difference in this respect because much of the “glory” Taiwan would receive would come from third parties, including the United States and its huge media market as well as in other democratic Asian countries and in Europe.

_Economic/Interest Group Lens_

**Source of the Problem:** From an economic/interest group perspective, Taiwan’s lack of concerted effort to arm itself seems rational. Key economic sub-groups, especially the powerful semiconductor industry, seem to view their centrality to so many global supply chains as sufficient defense (the so-called “silicon shield” thesis) and/or, as spelled out in the _Realist Lens_ section above, many of these sub-groups may not be entirely opposed to union with the PRC. Without a serious peer rival economic sub-group, the semiconductor industry’s overconfidence, ambivalence, or admixture of both about invasion scenarios explains much of Taiwanese behavior.

**Proposed Strategies:** While President Tsai Ing-wen has made developing Taiwanese state-backed defense primes a policy focus, direct positive alignment efforts may assist in accelerating this process. Further, the financial resources behind such a line of effort might galvanize support from sympathetic political and economic sub-groups for a much more rapid build-up, building upon the nationalistic and patriotic posture of the defense industry.

Indirect positive alignment strategies might not make sufficient material difference, given the lack of ready economic sub-group allies to counter TSMC’s political power. However, the United States might be able to underwrite and accelerate President Tsai’s “New Southbound Policy,” which aims to reduce Taiwan’s economic dependence on the Chinese market by pivoting toward ASEAN markets – such efforts by the United States could be linked with promises from economic beneficiaries to politically support increased defense spending.

Direct negative strategies should be certainly employed against the Taiwanese military and defense industry, particularly keyed to guiding production behavior away from “exquisite” systems and toward conventional, asymmetric capabilities.
Indirect negative or punitive strategies are risky, given global reliance on the Taiwanese semiconductor industry. Efforts to impose tariffs on TSMC and associated sub-groups would likely generate global resistance to the inevitable price increases. Additionally, U.S. efforts to partially re-shore and near-shore its semiconductor supply chains will take time to come to fruition, and further, it is not clear that efforts to accelerate this process or penalize TSMC would make a timely, material difference in Taiwanese defense efforts. To the degree that such a strategy might prove fruitful, however, placing tariffs on less powerful interest groups – such as the Formosa petrochemical, chemical, and plastics conglomerate – might provide a first step toward building the requisite critical mass for forming a political coalition for increased defense expenditure.
Canada

- Threat perception: Low
  - Severability: Low
  - U.S. military umbrella leverage: Medium
- Political/cultural factors:
  - Strong liberal internationalist orientation
  - Military and military force marginal in Canadian society and intellectual life
- Economic/interest group incentive to defense spending:
  - Limited

Overview

Canada is one of the most significant problem countries from a burden sharing point of view. While Canada is distant from any immediate threat, it is a significant, medium-sized country with a highly advanced economy, a member of the Five Eyes and G-7, and has a strong legacy of commitment to collective defense. Yet contemporary Canada’s level of defense spending and willingness to take on significant defense obligations is very low. Bringing Canada up to, for instance, UK levels of defense spending and effort – its historical bar – would lead to a major increase not only in Canadian effort but constitute a material contribution to allied security.

Historically, Canada was one of – indeed, perhaps the single most prominent – contributor to collective defense efforts. Despite its relatively small size, Canada heavily mobilized throughout both World Wars and made major contributions to victory in both of them. Indeed, it is worth noting that, while American contributions to the Second World War receive a lot of attention, Canada entered the war along with the United Kingdom and France in 1939, fought as part of the Allied cause throughout the war, and played a significant part in the Allied victory. As a symbol, America and Britain – two great powers – each took two beaches on D-Day, but much smaller Canada took one. By the end of the war, Canada had one of the world’s top five navies. The story was much the same in the First World War. Meanwhile, Canada contributed forces to the defense of European NATO during the Cold War. There is therefore a very strong Canadian tradition of making major contributions to collective defense.
Canada does have immediate security concerns in the Arctic, where receding ice is making new natural resources and shipping lanes available. The Arctic’s increased strategic importance has been accompanied by a major Russian military buildup in the region. As a result, some voices within Canada are calling for a more robust defense to protect the nation’s Arctic interests and sovereignty, with the invasion of Ukraine creating a new sense of urgency around potential Russian aggression. Yet Canada’s contributions to collective defense since the end of the Cold War have been far more modest. Today, Canada spends only roughly 1.4% of its GDP on defense, well below the levels of the Wales Summit pledge, and contributes relatively little to collective defense efforts.

Given Canada’s sophistication, relatively significant size, and legacy, getting Canada to spend and do more would make a material difference and thus should be a priority for U.S. burden sharing policy.

**Realist Lens**

*Source of Canadian Behavior:* From a realist point of view, Canada’s relative lethargy on defense is easily explicable. Canada is separated from most of the world’s major military powers by three major oceans. The only one that can plausibly threaten it seriously is the United States. But given its positive, stable relationship with the United States, America’s territorial satiation, and the manifest lack of a threat Canada poses to America, Canada need spend very little on defense to ensure its security.

Moreover, there is very little the United States can do to affect that perception. It cannot plausibly make Canada materially less secure without making itself less secure, given Canada’s neighboring position. To take one obvious example, drawing back the NORTHCOM-NORAD relationship with Canada would make America itself less secure.

*Proposed Strategies:* Because of this, it is hard to conceive of realist strategies that would help “move the needle” with Canada. The issue of Arctic sovereignty could be used to urge for a more robust Canadian defense, though it may be difficult to pass the buck to Canada on the Arctic security when the United States has territory in the region as well. Overall, encouraging Canada to take more responsibility for the Arctic, however, appears to be one of the most promising realist-oriented strategies to pursue with
Ottawa. While there may be tensions involved, on the whole it is an area about which Canada cares deeply and where it is well-positioned to take on more of the burden.

**Political/Ideological Lens**

*Source of Canadian Behavior:* Canada’s dominant political-ideological milieu can be described as broadly liberal/social democratic. While there is a strong moral/humanitarian element to Canada’s relationship to the outside world, military power and geopolitics have largely fallen out of view and the Canadian political consciousness. Canada’s small military is relatively obscured from most of Canadian society, and Canada has not participated in a major conflict since Korea, or in some ways the Second World War. Accordingly, from a burden sharing political-ideological point of view, Canada is a hard nut to crack.

That said, Canadian political culture has a strong streak of sympathy as well as, at least traditionally, a duty orientation. Canada prides itself on being a moral leader in the world. At the same time, traditional stereotypes emphasize the dutiful character of Canadians.

*Proposed Strategies:* In light of these factors, burden sharing strategies that emphasize the moral obligation and sympathy elements seem most likely to resonate in Canada.

**Economic/Interest Group Lens**

*Source of the Problem:* From an economic/interest group perspective, Canada’s historically low defense spending levels are completely rational. Given its very modest defense industry – boasting only one member of the top one hundred global defense primes – Canadian sub-groups with interests in increased defense expenditure are, in relative terms, politically weak. Declining post-Cold War global defense budgets, combined with the size and power of defense prime competitors in the United States for potential market, have ensured this continued weakness.

Further, given Canada’s relatively secure geographic position, it lacks a ready-made political sub-group interested in seeking greater defense efforts.

*Proposed Strategies:* Given Canada’s relatively modest defense industry, *direct alignment* strategies are unlikely to make a significant difference – especially in a timely manner.
However, *direct negative or punitive alignment* strategies may prove effective, especially if deployed against sub-groups attached to Canada’s important energy export industry. Due to the Russo-Ukrainian War’s effects on oil prices and, relatedly, resurgent interest from U.S. producers in expanding domestic production, pressure might profitably be applied to Canadian sub-groups tied exporting oil and natural gas to U.S. clients.
FRANCE

- Threat perception: Low
  - Severability: Low
  - U.S. military umbrella leverage: Low
- Political/cultural factors:
  - “Grandeur” – leading role, relatively positive image of security and defense
- Economic/interest group incentive to defense spending:
  - Significant defense industry with need for markets/purchasers (AUKUS dynamic)

Overview

France is one of America’s more significant allies. It is one of the world’s largest economies and a political leader in Europe. Moreover, despite being by all accounts highly secure, France fields one of NATO Europe’s two most advanced and significant militaries, including one of its two nuclear arsenals. France spends a relatively significant amount on defense and, even more, employs that military abroad. It is an active leader in foreign and security policy in Europe and the European neighborhood.

France is therefore the opposite of a problem for the United States from a burden sharing perspective. While Washington and Paris have famously disagreed on a range of issues, Paris manifestly does well on “pulling its weight” in defense spending and deployment terms, certainly compared to other European NATO members. Paris is particularly unique among European nations other than the United Kingdom in being willing to take a leading part in military and security contingencies, including controversial ones. France is therefore more of a success story, at least in terms of level of effort and willingness to assume difficult or controversial security roles.

Yet France might plausibly do more, given its historically-rooted and oft-expressed grander ambitions.

Realist Lens

Source of French Behavior: From a realist point of view, it is not self-evident why France is willing to spend more on defense and take on more significant and often controversial military and security roles. France faces no serious higher-order threats to its security. Its neighbors, while rich and significant economies, lack anything like the
military means to attack or coerce France. It therefore could plausibly be as secure with a smaller and less active military.

A more persuasive realist account would emphasize that France has ambitions for influence and power beyond its borders that a strong military, Paris believes, may help facilitate. Having a strong military allows Paris to exercise greater political leadership than it otherwise would have in Europe as well as exert greater influence in its near abroad, for instance in North Africa.

But that begs the question of why France has such ambitions while its neighbors like Germany, Italy, and Spain do not, or at least do not to anything like the same degree. What is it about France that makes it have such greater ambitions? A realist account alone seems to leave this question under-addressed.

Proposed Strategies: In light of this, realist strategies for greater French burden sharing take on a clearer light. If France’s ends are not necessarily strictly explicable from a narrowly realist vantage, the strategies to induce it to do more can certainly be realist. In practical terms, if France wants a grand and leading role, the United States can help it achieve that in exchange for greater efforts toward collective goods America wants to offload or take a less burdensome part in fulfilling. If Paris wants to take a more significant and leading role in European security, and the United States needs to shift attention to the Indo-Pacific without creating a security vacuum in Europe, this presents a natural commonality of interest.

There is a natural bargain: the United States helps empower France, both directly and by supporting its efforts for a greater leading role in Europe and the European neighborhood, while France assumes – in a leading role along with other Europeans – greater responsibility for European defense and regional stability. This serves both parties. The United States benefits if Europe takes more responsibility for its own security and stability in its neighborhood. And corralling the European states to achieve this goal likely requires strong leadership. France wants to play a major part in that role.

At the same time, France needs the United States to attain a leading role in Europe. On its own, France lacks the material resources to command such a leadership role. Moreover, there is substantial skepticism about French leadership among many European states, skepticism that has if anything intensified in the wake of Russia’s
invasion of Ukraine. The United States can help bridge over these difficulties on both the material and political sides.

In practice, this can take several forms. For instance, the United States can encourage and support Frenchmen taking on more senior positions and role in NATO, including in the military command.

**Political/Ideological Lens**

*Source of French Behavior:* A fuller account of why France is willing to do more should look at its political-ideological sources. This lens would highlight France’s powerful self-conception as a leading, strong nation. While France certainly has vigorous debates about its history and legacy, there is a far stronger and deeper consensus within the French body politic about the value and even necessity of France’s role as a powerful and leading nation – in Europe and even the world. The sources for this conception are, of course, varied, but appear to be sufficiently shared across the French political spectrum to be an enduring feature of French foreign and defense policy.

The particular nature of the French conception of its ambitions naturally varies. But what seems to consistently characterize it is an aspiration for prominence and leadership – a kind of “grandeur,” in the typical phrase. At a minimum, this certainly seems to characterize the vision for France of President Macron.91

*Proposed Strategies:* The United States can encourage and support rather than try to deflate or contest French pretensions to a larger role in Europe and its neighborhood in particular. Instead of taking a rivalrous position toward Paris’ ambitions, in other words, the United States should instead encourage it. This would not be in a general frame, but rather in Europe. The United States would not encourage a French “third pole” – which would be self-defeating – but rather encourage France to conceive of its leadership role *within* a larger transatlantic condominium, with the United States and Europe aligned overall, including on China, but with France playing a leading role in Europe and its neighborhood.

**Economic/Interest Group Lens**

*Source of the Problem:* From an economic/interest group perspective, France’s relatively forward posture on defense spending, at least in relative terms, is entirely
rational. Still a consistent top-five defense industry globally, France has long played a key role in post-WWII global weapons exports markets. Consequently, defense’s share of export GDP – and concomitant political capital – also grew dramatically, rising from 8% of total exports in 1960 to an impressive 31% by 1990.\textsuperscript{92}

However, as defense budgets worldwide declined after the collapse of the Soviet Union, so did the relative political and economic fortunes of France’s defense industry. While still a major player within France’s manufacturing industry, manufacturing itself as a share of French GDP has declined precipitously since the end of the Cold War, dropping from about 15% of GDP in 1990 to less than 10% by 2020, taking a backseat primarily to the financial industry.\textsuperscript{93}

Despite President Macron’s concerted efforts to re-empower the sub-groups tied to the French defense industry as part of a more robust European defense posture, his diminished political power in recent elections poses a challenge for coalition building.

\textit{Proposed Strategies:} Given the high-level support from President Macron, the U.S. task in France should simply be to increase the marginal political bargaining power of sub-groups tied to the French defense industry, a goal that leaves all options on the table. \textit{Positive} approaches, especially \textit{direct positive} approaches, could prove useful in expanding the real purchasing power of the French defense budget, especially as French defense primes are negatively impacted by inflationary pressures.\textsuperscript{94} \textit{Indirect positive} approaches may prove less effective, given that the powerful financial and pharmaceutical sectors compete directly with U.S. counterparts.

\textit{Direct negative or punitive} approaches may be advisable in some circumstances, but per above sections the French industrial base and procurement processes should be given fairly wide latitude in arming both Europe’s eastern front and supplying regional contingencies, including operations in North Africa.
**UNITED KINGDOM**

- Threat perception: Low
  - Severability: Low
  - U.S. military umbrella leverage: Low
- Political/cultural factors:
  - Leadership, global Britain
- Economic/interest group incentive to defense spending:
  - Significant defense industry with need for markets/purchasers
  - Political resonance of deindustrialized regions

**Overview**

From a burden sharing perspective, the United Kingdom presents a similar picture as France. The United Kingdom is arguably the United States’ closest and, by some measures, most important ally. It is also one of the largest economies and a political leader in NATO and, despite Brexit, even Europe, especially in the wake of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Moreover, despite being by all accounts highly secure, the United Kingdom fields one of NATO Europe’s two most advanced and significant militaries, including one of its two nuclear arsenals. The United Kingdom also spends a relatively significant amount on defense and, even more, employs that military. It is an active leader in foreign and security policy in Europe and beyond.

Like France, the United Kingdom, is therefore the opposite of a problem for the United States from a burden sharing perspective. Especially with its recent plus up in defense under the Johnson government, London manifestly does well on “pulling its weight” in defense spending and deployment terms, certainly compared to other European NATO members. Like Paris, London is particularly unique among European nations in being willing to take a leading part in military and security contingencies, including controversial ones. The United Kingdom is therefore more of a success story, at least in terms of level of effort and willingness to assume difficult or controversial security roles.

Yet the United Kingdom might plausibly do more, given its historically-rooted and oft-expressed grander ambitions.
Realist Lens

Source of British Behavior: Like France, from a realist point of view it is not self-evident why the United Kingdom is willing to spend more on defense and take on more significant and often controversial military and security roles. The United Kingdom faces no serious higher-order threats to its security. Its neighbors, while rich and significant economies, lack anything like the military means to attack or coerce the United Kingdom. It therefore could plausibly be as secure with a smaller military.

A more persuasive realist account would emphasize that the United Kingdom has ambitions for influence and power beyond its borders that a strong military, London believes, may help facilitate. Having a strong military allows London to exercise greater political leadership than it otherwise would have in Europe as well as exert greater influence in other regions.

But that begs the question of why the United Kingdom has such ambitions while its neighbors in Europe – other than France – do not, or at least do not to anything like the same degree. What is it about the United Kingdom that makes it have such greater ambitions? A realist account alone seems to leave this question underaddressed. Before addressing proposed strategies, then, it is worth exploring the further potential sources for British behavior.

Proposed Strategies: In light of this, realist strategies for greater British burden sharing take on a clearer light. If Britain’s ends are not necessarily strictly explicable from a narrowly realist vantage, the strategies to induce it to do more can certainly be realist. In practical terms, if the United Kingdom wants an important leading role, the United States can help it achieve that in exchange for greater efforts toward collective goods America wants to offload or take a less burdensome part in fulfilling. If London wants to take a more significant and leading role in European or global security, and the United States needs to shift attention to the Indo-Pacific without creating a security vacuum in Europe or other regions such as the Middle East, this presents a natural commonality of interest.

There is a natural bargain: the United States helps empower the United Kingdom, both directly and by supporting its efforts for a greater leading role in Europe and the European neighborhood, as well as perhaps the Middle East and South Asia, while the United Kingdom assumes – in a leading role along with other Europeans – greater
responsibility for the defense of and regional stability in these areas. This serves both parties. The United States benefits if Europe and these other regions takes more responsibility for their own security and stability in its neighborhood. And corralling the European states to achieve this goal likely requires strong leadership. The United Kingdom wants to play a major part in that role. At the same time, the United Kingdom needs the United States to attain such a leading role. On its own, the United Kingdom lacks the material resources to command such a leadership role. The United States can help bridge over these difficulties on both the material and political sides.

In practice, this can take several forms. For instance, the United States can encourage and support Brits taking on more senior positions and role in NATO, including in the military command. It can also mean supporting British efforts to handle regional contingencies, such as in the Middle East and South Asia.

*Political/Ideological Lens*

*Source of British Behavior:* A fuller account of why the United Kingdom is willing to do more should look at its political-ideological sources. This lens would highlight the United Kingdom’s powerful self-conception as a leading, strong nation dedicated to advancing the international good. While Britain certainly has vigorous debates about its history and legacy, there is a far stronger and deeper consensus within the British body politic about the value and even necessity of the country’s role as a leading nation and contributor to international goods – in Europe and even the world. The sources for this conception are, of course, varied, but appear to be sufficiently shared across the British political spectrum to be an enduring feature of the United Kingdom’s foreign and defense policy.

The particular nature of the British conception of its ambitions naturally varies. But there is a strong element of a vigorous and moral leadership in British politics about its foreign policy. The United Kingdom has a strong liberal internationalist, humanitarian streak in its foreign policy, one that appears strong in the current Truss government.

*Proposed Strategies:* In similar ways to France, the United States can encourage British ambitions to a larger role in Europe and its neighborhood in particular.
Economic/Interest Group Lens

Source of the Problem: From an economic/interest group perspective, the United Kingdom’s relatively forward posture on defense spending, at least in relative terms, is entirely rational. A consistent top five defense industry globally, the UK has especially in recent years become a more competitive bidder for foreign defense contracts.95

However, as in France, declining global defense budgets after the collapse of the Soviet Union have led to diminished relative political and economic capital for the UK’s defense industry. While still a major player within the UK’s manufacturing industry, manufacturing itself as a share of British GDP has declined precipitously since the end of the Cold War, dropping from about 17% of GDP in 1990 to less than 9% by 2020, ceding ground primarily to the London financial industry.96

Unlike in France, however, sub-groups tied to the UK defense industry do not currently have a clear political champion. While Conservative governments have in recent years increased the defense budget only modestly, the Labour agenda has focused its efforts on increasing social and green infrastructure spending rather than defense. Recently, however, the latter may be changing course.

Proposed Strategies: The United Kingdom, like the United States, has a political culture recently reawakened to the deleterious economic consequences of deindustrialization, especially in particular regions. Renewed industrial activity, fueled by greater defense spending, could become a key platform plank for either major UK political party – something Labour has shown a particular interest in as it attempts to regain seats in their traditional territory that voted for Brexit.97

In light of these developments, U.S. approaches should likely avoid direct negative or punitive alignment approaches and instead encourage the political salience of the defense spending issue via direct positive alignment approaches. Such an approach might encourage a bi-partisan consensus and competition on spending increases in an effort to win back voters in de-industrialized regions.
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<tr>
<td><strong>Japan</strong></td>
<td>As the third largest global economy and second-largest economy in the U.S. defense network, Japan possesses the power, wealth, location, and threat perception to make a significant difference in the fate of any anti-hegemonic coalition.</td>
<td>The U.S. can threaten that, unless Japan increases its defense spending and level of effort, it will not make such vigorous efforts to defend Japan fully but opt for a more defense-in-depth approach. (e.g., pull back commitment to defend the Senkaku Islands as untenable given the lack of Japanese effort).</td>
<td>The U.S. can emphasize two particular themes to Japanese audiences: 1) that greater efforts on collective defense are <em>legitimate</em>, and 2) that Japan has a <em>duty</em> to undertake them.</td>
<td>The U.S. can subsidize Japanese defense primes – either via direct support or via bond purchases – to expand real purchasing power of Japanese defense budget.</td>
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<td><strong>Germany</strong></td>
<td>As the largest economy in Europe, Germany must play the central role in NATO defense. Given its central geographic location and leading role in the European Union and other European bodies, it should be a natural leader in Europe in terms of coordinating Allied defenses.</td>
<td>The U.S. should emphasize the limited and declining ability of the United States to defend Europe as a whole to focus on Asia; Germany must plug the gap.</td>
<td>The U.S. can highlight three themes to induce greater German defense efforts: 1) that greater efforts on collective defense are <em>legitimate</em>, 2) that Germany has a <em>duty</em> to undertake them, 3) cultivating German <em>sympathy</em> for its European neighbors.</td>
<td>The U.S. can subsidize German defense primes – either via direct support or via bond purchases – to expand real purchasing power of German defense budget.</td>
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<td>Country</td>
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<td><strong>Taiwan</strong></td>
<td>As the most vulnerable part of the U.S. defense perimeter, Taiwan's loss would deal a heavy blow to the success of any anti-hegemonic coalition; in light of the heightened threat from the PLA, augmenting self-defense is critical.</td>
<td>The U.S. could clearly and urgently emphasize that the United States will in fact cut Taiwan off – severing it from its defense perimeter – if Taiwan does not spend more for its own defense and spend what it does allocate more efficiently.</td>
<td>The U.S. could promote a stronger support for defense among Taiwanese by promoting a kind of glory – that Taiwan stands as the vanguard of freedom and that its efforts to defend itself are watched and admired by free people around the world, in the vein of what is happening in Ukraine.</td>
<td>The U.S. can subsidize Taiwanese defense primes to expand real purchasing power of Taiwanese defense budget; targeted tariffs may be profitably employed outside of the semiconductor industry.</td>
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<td><strong>Canada</strong></td>
<td>Given Canada’s historic role as a contributor in times of global crisis, inducing increase in spending levels closer to the UK; Canada can also take the lead on Arctic security, in which it has extant and increasing threat perception.</td>
<td>Given Canada’s relatively high sense of physical security, the U.S. will find it difficult to conceive of effective realist strategies but might highlight Arctic security issues as an area for mutual cooperation.</td>
<td>Given Canada’s rich history in contributing to security efforts during global crises, the U.S. should emphasize Canada’s historic understanding of its moral obligation to and sympathies for collective Western security.</td>
<td>While direct support for Canadian defense primes is unlikely to make a material difference within the necessary timeline, the U.S. could deploy targeted tariffs against energy producers competing with U.S. counterparts.</td>
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<td><strong>France</strong></td>
<td>As one of Europe’s largest economies and Paris’ leadership role within the EU, France should take a lead role – alongside Germany and the UK – in taking primary responsibility for NATO security efforts.</td>
<td>The U.S. can encourage and support French personnel taking on more senior positions and role in NATO, including in the military command. It can also support French efforts to handle regional contingencies, such as in North Africa.</td>
<td>The U.S. can encourage France to conceive of its leadership role within a larger transatlantic condominium, with the U.S. and Europe aligned overall, including on China, but with France playing a leading regional role.</td>
<td>Given high-level support from President Macron, the U.S. can subsidize French defense primes to expand the real purchasing power of French defense budget; targeted tariffs against smaller industrial sectors may also prove useful at margin.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>THE UNITED KINGDOM</strong></td>
<td>As one of Europe’s largest economies and historic self-view as a ‘great power,’ the UK should take a lead role – alongside Germany and the France – in taking primary responsibility for NATO security efforts.</td>
<td>The U.S. can encourage and support British personnel taking on more senior positions and role in NATO, including in the military command. It can also support British efforts to handle regional contingencies, such as in the Middle East and South Asia.</td>
<td>The U.S. would not encourage the UK to conceive of its leadership role within a larger transatlantic condominium, with the U.S. and Europe aligned overall, including on China, but with the UK playing a leading role.</td>
<td>Given renewed political focus on winning back deindustrialized regions, the U.S. can subsidize UK defense primes to expand real purchasing power of UK defense budget; targeted tariffs against smaller industrial sectors may also prove useful at margin.</td>
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4 The need for a clear burden sharing strategy holds even following Russia’s early 2022 assault on Ukraine. At first glance, Moscow’s invasion has “solved” much of the burden sharing problem in Europe: it has raised the European states’ perception of the threat Russia poses, and led to dramatic pledges of increased defense effort by Germany, Poland, Romania, and a number of others. At its most basic, this actually substantiates the point of the realist frame; there is nothing like a perception of a real threat to drive change in state behavior. The problem, however, is whether this new shift will be sustained and how it will be carried through. Especially given Russian difficulties and expenditure of military resources, it is possible that perceptions of the threat from Moscow will wane, leading to a lack of follow-through in commitments or to only notional follow-through without addressing NATO’s actual security requirements. The United States will, therefore, need to have a clear burden sharing strategy to ensure Europe actually does more to address shared security challenges.


6 Logically, this approach could also include deliberately hyping the threat. Leaving aside moral considerations, this course is unlikely to be especially effective, particularly over time. Allies are likely to be able to discern a material hyping of the threat, reducing its effectiveness and also diminishing U.S. credibility. Thus, while there may be credible arguments for more focused uses of threat exaggeration, this study does not include consideration of hyping as a deliberate strategy.

7 This dynamic could also stem from a political culture that underestimates the threat or certain kinds of threats, for instance because of ideological, confessional, or ethnic affinity.


9 Direct measures would, by definition, be a hostile act and presumably incompatible with being an ally – indeed it could very well drive the ally into the opposing camp. Even looked at in the most generous light as a potential strategy, direct threats are likely to be more effective at influencing an ally toward a particular, critical decision – for instance to allow the use of territory for military operations or provision of critical support in wartime – rather than changing ongoing, longer-term behavior.

Withdrawing an alliance commitment is on the border between a direct and indirect form of increasing an ally’s threat perception. But because it involves withdrawing a good rather than a direct imposition of harm by the United States, it appears to fit better in the indirect category.

Russian threat also clearly a driver but hard to discount the impact of this approach.


The author offers his own proposed definition in Strategy of Denial, pages 167-169.


“The Bundeswehr in the Cold War,” https://www.bundeswehr.de/en/about-bundeswehr/history/cold-war


It is worthwhile to note that the realist approach would not counsel such focus on the political/ideological characteristics of the allied government, since the realist approach would indicate that the ally will tend to make decisions based on its security perceptions, no matter whether, for instance, liberal, Marxist, conservative, etc.


This is different than enabling or welcoming in-country movements toward a more aligned government in partner countries. Indeed, many of the governmental changes during the Cold War that did result in more anti-Communist governments, such as Indonesia and many Latin American countries in the 1960s and 1970s, were made without significant U.S. involvement (although often at a very high cost in abuses).


39 Such a program could be administered via the DoD’s Foreign Military Sales (FMS) program, the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA), the Defense Contract Management Agency (DCMA), or some combination thereof. A further benefit of this approach is that purchased bonds would represent assets, not liabilities, on the USG balance sheet and, in theory, could be lent against to fund U.S. defense R&D, industrial capacity, etc.


Custom map created using mapchart.net.


https://milex.sipri.org/sipri


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58 Elbridge Colby, “Going Big Early?: Examining China’s Incentives to Strike First, Early, And Hard,” Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA), July 2022, unreleased.


66 I am grateful to Wess Mitchell for this insight.


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93 World Bank, “Manufacturing, value added (% of GDP) – France,”
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